
Class 
Book, 



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Copyright}!^. 



CDEXRIGHT DEPOSm 



AN ESSAY 



m 



Practical Philosophy 



RELATIONS 

of 

WISDOM and PURPOSE 



By 
RICHARD JUSTIN McCARTY 



1922 



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Copyright, 1922 
By RICHARD JUSTIN McCARTY 



PRESS OF JOS. D. HAVENS CO. 



JUN -6 IS22 



©CI.A677011 



TO 
THE ROTARIANS. 

In appreciation of their faith in 
the Wisdom of persistent and co-oper- 
ative effort, action and service in pro- 
motion of the general welfare of man- 
kind. 



Compliments of 


R. J. McCARTY 


3820 ^iVarwick Boulevard 


KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 



ARGUMENT, 



The nature and practical significance of 
purposes and the means and methods used in 
their prosecution and achievement constitute 
the only available criterion of Wisdom. 

Kansas City, Missouri, 
March 1 2, 1 922. 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 

THE PURPOSES OF MAN. 

Page 

Standard Definitions of Purpose 1 

Conception of a Purpose 2 

Determination of a Purpose 3 

Resolution 3-4 

Object of a Purpose 5 

Accomplishment of Object 5-6 

Achievement of a Purpose 6-7 

Subordinate Purposes 7-8 

Definite Purpose 8 

Indefinite Purpose 8 

No Human Purpose Strictly Definite 9-10 

Classificaton of Human Purposes 10-15 

CHAPTER II. 

GOOD AND EVIL PURPOSES. 

Pleasure and Pain 16-17 

Natural and Artficial Causes 17 

Natural and Artificial Conditions 18-19 

Distinctions of Good and Evil 20-21 

Human Welfare 22 

Human Progress 23 

Sources of Human Progress 24-25 

Avoidance and Compensation 26 

Death Not a Natural Evil 27 

Pain a Protection 28 

Basis of Distinctions 29 

Justified by Scriptures 30-31 

Definition of a Good Purpose 32 

Definition of an Evil Purpose 32 



CHAPTER III. 

PREDOMINANCE OF GOOD PURPOSES. 

Page 

Opinions of Good and Evil Variable 33 

Good Purposes Prolific 34 

Evil Purposes Tend to Their Own Correction 35 

Good Purposes Must Prevail Over Evil 36 

Development of Human Progress 36-38 

Historical Evidence of Predominance of Good Over 

Evil 39-44 

Moral Evolution 45-46 



CHAPTER IV. 

CAUSE, EFFECT AND PRINCIPLE. 

Cause, Effect and Event 47 

General Classification of Causes 48 

Definition of Elnergy 49 

Classification of Energies 49 

Definition of Principle 50 

Development of Principles as Conditions 

Necessary for Achievement of Purposes. . . .50-58 

Basis of Development 51-52 

Principle of Causation 53 

Principle of Regulation 53 

Principle of Stability 54 

Principle of Conservation of Matter 55 

Principle of Correlation of Energies 55-57 

Principle of Conservation of Energies 58 

Testimony of Science 59-61 

General Demonstration of Principles 62-64 



II 



CHAPTER V. 

LAW AND ORDER. 

Page 

Conception of a Natural Law 65 

Classification of Laws 65-69 

Conditions of a Law 69-7 1 

Self-enforcement of Law 70 

Co-operative Causes 72-73 

More than a Single Cause for Every 

Conceivable Effect 72 

Conception of Order 73 

Rules of Order 74-75 

Number and Variety 75 

Practical Illustration 76-77 

Rules of Order for Co-operation of Men 77 

Sensation 78 

Thought . 78 

Emotion 79 

Relations of Sensation, Thought and 

Emotion , 79-80 

Human Welfare and Progress the only Practicable 

Basis for Co-operation of Men 81 

Law and Order , 82 

CHAPTER VL 

MEANS AND METHOD. 

Definition of Means 83 

Summary of Available Means 83 

Definition of Method 84 

General Method of Achievement 85 

Practical Examples of Method 86-88 

Metaphysical Conception of Method 89-90 

Modification of Means and Method 90-92 

Resources Available to Man 93-94 



III 



CHAPTER VII. 

INTELLECTUAL EFFICIENCY. 

Page 

Conception of Intellectual Efficiency 95 

Criterion of Intellectual Efficiency 95 

Intellectual Qualifications 96-1 1 3 

Spirit 97-104 

Knowledge .., 1 04-1 08 

Discretion 1 09-11 

Spirit, Knowledge and Discretion ... 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 
General Definition of Intellectual Efficiency 113 



CHAPTER VIII. 

FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL EFFICIENCY. 

Theoretical Ability 114-118 

Speculative Ability 115 

Mathematical Ability 115 

Experimental Ability 115 

Practical Ability 116-127 

Dexterity 117-119 

Development 117-118 

Limitations 118-119 

Skill 119-122 

Development 1 20-1 2 1 

Limitations 121-122 

Executive Ability 1 22-1 27 

Development 123-125 

Degrees of Executive Ability 125-127 

Efficiency of Executive Ability Depends upon the 

Practical Significance of Free Will 127 



IV 



CHAPTER IX. 

FREE WILL AND EXECUTIVE ABIUTY. 

Page 

Doctrine of Free Will 128 

Opposite Doctrine 128 

Doctrine of Free Will can be neither Proved 

nor Disproved 129-1 32 

Apparent Absence of Free Will may be Caused 

by an Act of Free Will Itself 1 32 

Relations of Free Will to Executive Ability 1 33-1 35 

Predominance of Good Purposes Indicates 

that, in Practice, Man is not entirely a 

Free Agent 135 

Basis of Executive Ability 1 36-1 38 



CHAPTER X. 

THE WISDOM OF MAN. 

Wisdom, the Name of Intellectual Excellence 1 39 

Method of Reaching a Conception of Wisdom 1 39-140 

Different Conceptions of Wisdom 1 40-1 45 

Metaphysical Conception of Intellectual 

Excellence 1 46-1 47 

Definitions of Wisdom Given in Standard 

Dictionaries 1 48-1 50 

General Conception of Wisdom here Reached 150 

Wisdom Implicitly Defined 151 

Wisdom Involves Intellectual Efficiency 151 

Judgment 1 52-1 53 

Virtue 154 

Elxplicit Definition of Wisdom 155 



CHAPTER XL 
DEGREES OF HUMAN WISDOM. 

Page 
Pleasure in Pursuit of Knowledge often Detrimental 

to Wisdom of Individual 1 56-1 60 

Improves Wisdom, as a Whole ^. 1 60-1 61 

Wisdom and Knowledge 1 61 -1 62 

Wisdom and Discretion 1 62-1 63 

Wisdom and Judgment 1 63- 1 64 

Wisdom and Virtue 165 

Individual Wisdom not Extensive 1 66 

Collective Wisdom Extensive 1 66-1 67 

Degrees of Individual Wisdom 1 68-1 72 

Highest Degree of Human Wisdom 177 



CHAPTER XII. 
UNLIMITED WISDOM. 

Scriptural Conception of The Absolute Cause 1 74-1 75 

Divine and Human Wisdom the Same in Kind 175 

Consequences of Unlimited Wisdom 1 76-1 79 

A Single Definite Purpose, lllimitably Good and 

Great ...177 

Greatest Scope of Self-enforcing Law^ and 

Order 177-178 

Original Crudity of All Existing Things 1 78 

Accordance With Phenomena of Existence. ... 1 79-184 
Relations of Wisdom to Purpose and to Law and 

Order 184-188 

Beneficial Consequences 1 88-1 89 

General Conclusion 190 



VI 



CHAPTER I 

THE PURPOSES OF MAN. 

A Purpose, according to recognized au- 
thorities is: 

An idea or ideal kept before 
the mind as an end or aim of effort 
or action. 

According to these same authorities a 

purpose may also be regarded cis: 

A resolution to attain to an end 
or aim. 

While these definitions apparently relate 
to different things they really represent differ- 
ent aspects of the same thing because an end 
or aim must involve a resolution and a resolu- 
tion alvsrays involves an end or aim. 

For this reason either definition is ac- 
ceptable under certain conditions and accord- 
ing to the point of view. 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

In this treatise, however, the term Pur- 
pose is used in the comprehensive sense ex- 
pressed by the proposition that: 

A purpose is determined in the 
mind w^henever a resolution is made 
to attain to an end or aim. 

Since attainment to an end or aim re- 
quires action and since action can be recog- 
nized only through its effect every end or aim 
may be regarded as the final effect of intended 
action. 

Therefore, the significance of the term 
Purpose as used in this treatise may be more 
explicitly stated by means of the proposi- 
tion : 

Whenever a man resolves to 
bring about or cause to be brought 
about any mental or physical effect 
there is determined in the mind of 
that man what is known as a pur- 
pose. 



DETERMINATION OF A PURPOSE. 

The determination of a purpose in the 
mind consists of reaching a conception of the 
final intended effect and of forming a resolu- 
tion to produce it or to cause it to be produced. 
The conception may be definite, as in the case 
of a proposed building for which plans and 
specifications have been prepared; or it may 
be indefinite as, for instance, when it relates 
exclusively to the acquisition of knowledge or 
wrhen a person tries to escape from some dis- 
agreeable or dangerous situation writhout re- 
gard to any other consequences of his or her 
action. But in every case there must be some 
kind of a conception in order that a resolution 
may be possible. 

The resolution to produce the final in- 
tended effect must be such as to insure action, 
for otherwise there would exist in the mind 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

nothing more than a vague inclination which 
might be entirely without practical signifi- 
cance. Also, the resolution must insure im- 
mediate action because if not then it might be 
merely an intention and be subsequently aban- 
doned, making it equivalent to an inclination. 
Again, the resolution must insure persist- 
ent although not necessarily continuous action 
tow^ards the intended effect for otherwise it 
might be given up after action had been taken 
and solely because that action had been based 
not on a resolution but on an inclination. On 
the other hand every resolution, how^soever 
complete, must yield when it becomes known 
that the intended effect cannot be produced. 
Thus, abandonment of effort or action does 
not always indicate a w^ant of original resolu- 
tion. 



RESOLUTION AND OBJECT. 

Therefore, it ^svould seem that the only 
acceptable evidence of a resolution is persist- 
ent effort or action in the direction of the in- 
tended effect until all the operations shall have 
been completed and the final result deter- 
mined. 

The object of a purpose is the final in- 
tended effect. Experience shows that in the 
end it often does not correspond to the orig- 
inal conception upon vvrhich the resolution may- 
have been based. Sometimes this is because 
the original conception had not been exact 
and sometimes it is because the precise effect 
was not found to be practicable. 

Accomplishment of the object is the pro- 
duction of the final intended effect or its prac- 
tical equivalent. Unintentional production of 
an effect considered in relation to the mind of 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

the person by whom it was produced is not 
equivalent to accompKshment of an object be- 
cause in such a case there would be no resolu- 
tion and, therefore, no purpose. Experience 
shows that accomplishment of an object usu- 
ally begins after the formation of the purpose 
in the mind but that in many cases certain work 
necessary for the determination of the purpose 
may be used in the accomplishment of the ob- 
ject; as, for instance, surveys, plans and spec- 
ifications made with a view^ to ascertaining 
whether a railroad or other structure shall be 
built. 

As is well known, the accomplishment of 
the object need not always be prosecuted or 
completed by the person with whom the pur- 
pose may have originated. 

The achievement of a purpose consists of 



ACHIEVEMENT OF PURPOSE. 

the performanee of all mental and physical 
operations necessary to determine the purpose 
in the mind and to accomplish the object. 

Since certain purposes may be determin- 
ed in the mind of one person and their objects 
accomplished by others, achievement of a pur- 
pose may be regarded as consisting of two dis- 
tinct although closely related operations. 

Experience proves that the achievement 
of a purpose often requires the production of 
several subordinate effects and that each of 
these effects is or may be regarded as the ob- 
ject of a subordinate purpose. 

Also, experience shows that, as a rule, 
subordinate purposes may be achieved by dif- 
ferent persons co-operating in such a manner 
as to bring about the final intended effect of 
the general purpose with much more expedi- 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tion and efficiency than would otherwise be 
possible. This means, of course, that the gen- 
eral purpose is, in effect, a combination of all 
those which may be subordinate to it. 

Too much emphasis cannot be given to 
the importance of the condition here involved 
because, without it, all purposes of great and 
enduring benefit w^hich require co-operation 
of a number of men would be impracticable; 
also, because although the condition is general- 
ly well-known its importance in practice is 
often far from being fully appreciated. 

A definite purpose is one that has a clear- 
ly defined object which is known to be prac- 
ticable and is certain to be accomplished. 

An indefinite purpose either has an in- 
definite object or is determined in the mind 
w^ithout know^ledge that the object is practica- 
ble. 



DEFINITE PURPOSES. 

To be able to achieve a definite purpose 
it is evident that a man must have decision of 
character, clearness of conception, foreknowl- 
edge of future conditions and ability to ac- 
quire, adapt and apply suitable means with 
precision as against every influence w^hich 
might otherwise defeat the purpose. 

Now, there are many men of great deci- 
sion; some are so from ignorance, some are 
regarded as eccentric and others are recog- 
nized as men of common sense, talent or gen- 
ius, each according to his achievements and to 
the mental attitude of those w^ho may indulge 
their propensity to judge. But decision does 
not insure achievement for, in addition to re- 
strictions of environment, every man wants 
foreknowledge and lacks precision, so that his 
best results are generally mere approxima- 
tions. 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Therefore, every human purpose may be 
regarded as more or less indefinite. 

The purposes lof man may be classified 
generally with respect to their objects as the- 
oretical and practical. 

Theoretical purposes are those which 
have for their objects the acquisition, promul- 
gation and inculcation of knowledge w^ithout 
definite regard to its immediate practical ap- 
plication. 

A theoretical purpose may be specula- 
tive, mathematical or experimental. 

A speculative purpose is one that is con- 
fined to study, thought and instruction con- 
cerning the phenomena of the intellect and its 
relations to cause and effect. 

A mathematical purpose relates exclu- 
sively to knowledge of fact and truth concern- 



10 



EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSES. 

ing the relations of magnitude and quantity. 

An experimental purpose is one that re- 
lates to the development of fact and truth by 
experiment and may have for its object either 
the discovery of the cause or causes which, un- 
der certain conditions, may be required to pro- 
duce a certain effect or the ascertainment of 
the effect which a certain cause or certain 
causes, when placed under given conditions, 
may be depended upon to produce. 

Now^, the practical importance of a dis- 
covery that certain causes placed under cer- 
tain conditions will bring about a certain ef- 
fect depends upon the conditions as well cis 
upon the causes, for unless similar conditions 
obtain, the same effect may not be produced. 
Also, it is well known that the same effect may 
often be brought about by different causes un- 



11 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 

der different conditions. Consequently, since 
the practical importance of experimental pur- 
poses is often problematical they are here 
treated as theoretical. 

Practical purposes are those which have 
for their general object the production of a 
definite effect upon the practical affairs of life. 

A practical purpose may be intuitive, 
empirical or tentative. 

An intuitive purpose is one that seems 
to spring from impulse and to be completed by 
instinctive processes. As so understood, 
many if not all intuitive purposes correspond 
closely if not exactly to those indicated by the 
activities of certain of the lovsrer animals. 

An empirical purpose is that which re- 
quires appreciable mental effort for its 
achievement and which is known to be similar 



12 



TENTATIVE PURPOSES. 

to some purpose previously achieved and 
which can be repeated under present condi- 
tions. These are understood to include all the 
ordinary recurrent purposes of life that are not 
intuitive. 

A tentative purpose is one that has for 
its object either an effect that is not known 
to have been produced before or the more effi- 
cient achievement of a previous purpose. 

Tentative purposes are often undertaken 
-with, inadequate or false notions of probable 
or possible results. They thus include those 
which fail from an improper selection of 
means, those which miscarry from an ineffi- 
cient use of suitable means and those w^hich 
cannot be achieved by any means w^hatever. 
Far be it, however, that he who prosecutes 
such purposes should be disparaged, for he it 



13 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

is whose enterprising spirit often causes him 
to blunder on fact and truth, succeed beyond 
all expectation and become an excellent ex- 
ample of what a great man judged by his 
works might be. In addition to this even those 
tentative purposes that fail lor miscarry always 
tend to increase the store of practical experi- 
ence. 

TTierefore, as is otherwise v^eW know^n, 
tentative purposes, regardless of success or 
failure, constitute a great source of industrial 
and social progress. 

It will be observed that, under the defi- 
nitions given, the difference between an ex- 
perimental purpose and a tentative purpose is 
that the former is achieved for sake of knowl- 
edge alone while the latter is prosecuted and 
completed for sake of its practical effect. 



14 



GREAT PURPOSES. 

A purpose is generally considered great 
according to the number and importance of 
the subordinate purposes which are merged 
into the accomplishment of the final object. 

A purpose is also recognized as great in 
proportion to the immediate and to the ulti- 
mate consequences of its achievement. 



15 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER II. 

GOOD AND EVIL PURPOSES. 

It is natural for men to base distinctions 
of good and evil upon sensations and emotions 
of immediate pleasure and pain rather than 
upon the remote consequences of the conduct 
or action that may result from those feelings. 

This tendency is shown by the philos- 
opher Thomas Hobbes in the statement that: 

"Every man calleth that which 
pleaseth, and is delightful to him- 
self, good: and that evil which dis- 
pleaseth him." 

The celebrated philosopher John Locke 

expressed himself similarly thus: 

"Things then are good or evil 
only in reference to pleasure or 
pain.*' 

The same tendency is indicated by the 

16 



GOOD AND EVIL PURPOSES. 

standard dictionaries, according to w^hich: 

Good is: 

* 'Adapted to give or giving 
pleasure." 

Also: * 'Having qualities adapted to pro- 
duce some kind of satisfaction, 
whether physical, mental or moral." 

Evil is: 

"Producing or threatening 
pain, sorrow^, distress, injury or 
calamity." 

Also: Possessing injurious nature or 
qualities; unwholesome; hurtful 
hostile to the welfare of any crea- 
ture.** 

A sensation of pleasure or of pain is an 
effect of a certain cause upon a certain person 
under certain conditions. 

A cause is understood to be natural w^hen 
free from the influence of human control; and 
to be artificial w^hen and to the degree it is 
subjected to such influence. 

17 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

A condition is regarded as natural when 
it has been brought about in the natural course 
of events unchanged by human interference, 
and as artificial to the extent that it has been 
affected by the conduct of man. 

Experience shows that under different 
natural conditions the same cause may give 
the same man pleasure at one time and pain 
at another. For illustration : 

Fire sometimes gives pleasure and some- 
times pain, according to natural conditions 
and the same is true of air, of v/ater, of the 
earth and, consequently, of the causes they 
involve. This being true, it appears that 
every natural cause by w^hich a man may be 
affected might, under the definitions given, 
sometimes be good and sometimes evil w^hile 
the cause itself would remain unchanged. 
Again, the same natural causes under the 

18 



PLEASURE AND PAIN. 

same natural conditions may sometimes af- 
ford pleasure and sometimes give pain to the 
same man according to his conduct with re- 
spect to those causes and conditions. 

But it is manifest that contrary epithets 
cannot, without qualification, be properly 
applied at different times to a thing that has 
not undergone a change. 

Therefore, definite distinctions of good 
and evil cannot apply to natural causes or to 
natural conditions. 

It is w^ell known, how^ever, that the same 
man will experience the same sensation of 
pleasure or of pain as often as he places him- 
self in the same relations to certain natural or 
artificial causes and conditions; also that the 
sensation can be depended upon to vary in 
regular accordance with any change he may 
make in those relations. 

19 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Now, in so far as the relations of a man 
to any natural cause are not controlled by him 
they may be regarded as natural conditions, 
and to the extent that those relations are under 
his control his sensations of pleasure and of 
pain are determined by his own action. 

Therefore, distinctions of good and evil 
must be established with especial reference to 
human conduct. 

Now, human conduct may give pleasure 
which is followed as a consequence by compar- 
atively greater pain, such, for instance, as dis- 
sipation, and it is clear that this should not be 
recognized as good. On the other hand, 
human conduct may give immediate pain 
succeeded by proportionately greater pleas- 
ure, as, for example, hard and honest labor, 
and it is manifest that this should not be re- 
garded as evil. 

20 



WELFARE AND PROGRESS. 

Consequently, immediate pleasure and 
immediate pain resulting from human conduct 
are not sufficient as a general basis for dis- 
tinctions of good and evil. 

This condition, however, may be met by 
basing all distinctions of good and evil upon 
human conduct considered v^ith respect to its 
effect upon the ultimate welfare and progress 
of man. For, it is evident that to the extent 
human conduct contributes in the end to hu- 
man welfare and progress it must be recog- 
nized as good and in so far as it is detrimental 
to the ultimate welfare and progress of man it 
must be regarded as evil. 

Therefore, all distinctions of good and 
evil should be made with particular reference 
to the influence of human conduct upon the 
ultimate welfare and progress of mankind. 

21 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Human -welfare, according to standard 

authority, is: 

**State or condition in regard 
to well-being; especially condition 
of health, happiness, prosperity 
and the like; negatively, exemp- 
tion from evil or calamity." 

This includes both physical and intellec- 
tual welfare and is understood to mean that: 

Physical welfare is that state which 
makes it practicable to procure adequate 
safety, sufficient food and suitable comfort: 
and that: 

Intellectual welfare is that condition of 
knowledge, intellectual ability, mental dis- 
cipline and refinement in which the mind is 
undisturbed by fear or suffering, is able to 
resist temptation, control passion, banish pre- 
judice, is qualified to achieve purposes and is 
not misled by any false theories or impracti- 
cable ideals. 

22 



THE PROGRESS OF MAN, 

Human progress, as defined by accepted 
authority, is: 

* 'Advance in physical, mental 
or moral development, condition or 
position." 

In view of the definition of welfare this 
is understood to mean that: 

Physical progress is advance in physical 
welfare or in the conditions affecting safety, 
food and comfort; and that: 

Intellectual progress is advance in intel- 
lectual welfare or in knowledge, intellectual 
ability, mental discipline and refinement. 

It must be admitted that between the 
first appearance of man on earth and the pres- 
ent time there has been some human progress. 
For to deny this would be to deny the validity 
of every recognized standard of physical, 
social, moral, intellectual and spiritual ex- 
cellence. 

23 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

This progress could have been due only 
to natural causes, to the activities of man or 
to both. 

This condition is w^ell expressed by the 
philosophic historian Buckle as follows: 

**Thus we have man modifying 
nature, and nature modifying man; 
w^hile out of this reciprocal action all 
events must spring." 

The exact extent to which the progress 
of man to date has been brought about by nat- 
ural causes is, of course, problematical but it 
w^ould not seem to exceed the natural progress 
of the present savasfe w^ho has always depend- 
ed most upon natural causes and least upon his 
ow^n activities. Consequently, if from the 
total progress of this savage there could be 
deducted that brought about by the efforts he 
has been compelled to make in advancement 

24 



THE PROGRESS OF MAN. 

of his welfare there would remain the total 
progress of man resulting from natural causes 
to date. This, according to the best available 
data, w^ould be practically the natural progress 
of the highest of the lower animals; and this 
may be disregarded because, evidently, it is 
only the progress w^hich has raised man above 
the beast that need be considered. 

Therefore, natural causes except to the 
extent that they were used as means, have, 
contributed practically nothing to the advance- 
ment of human welfare. 

Whence the proposition that: 

The progress of man originates 
in and is determined by his own con- 
duct. 

This w^as expressed by Buckle thus: 

'*The only progress w^hich is 
really effective depends not upon 
the bounty of nature but upon the 
energy of man." 

25 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

For sake of completeness it is proper to 
enquire whether natural causes are detrimen- 
tal to human progress. 

Experience shows that natural causes 
w^hich men constantly fear, such as those tend- 
ing to produce disease and w^ant, may often be 
turned to permanent advantage by the exercise 
of prudence, industry and thrift. Those which 
men dread but cannot or do not avoid seldom 
equal the serious apprehensions of the sufferer. 
Natural causes from which men suffer short 
of death may, as a rule, be overcome by cour- 
age, fortitude and the proper use of the means 
that may be at command; and even though 
this may involve great effort, pain and depri- 
vation it results in progress because it leaves 
those w^ho are affected better and abler than 
before and in addition gives to them that pre- 
eminent satisfaction afforded by the conscious- 

26 



THE PROGRESS OF MAN. 

ness of dangers past and labors well perform- 
ed. Nor does there seem to be the slightest 
conclusive evidence that causes w^hich are be- 
yond control of man have ever been really in- 
imical to his ultimate welfare and progress. 
On the contrary, natural causes whose pain- 
ful effects cannot be avoided by human agency 
are often made tolerable if not beneficial by 
the natural laws of physical and mental adap- 
tation. These failing, the natural result is 
death. 

But it is certain that in common with 
plants and the lower animals men must die 
in order that their posterity may prosper and 
progress, so that, if judged by the greatest 
good to the greatest number, which is the only 
available criterion, it must be conceded that 
even death, as the result of natural causes, is 
not an evil. 

27 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

In addition to this, were it not for the sen- 
sations and emotions of pain there would be 
nothing to warn men of immediate danger and 
thus prevent them from blindly contributing 
to their own destruction. 

In this connection the philosopher John 
Locke states that: 

**Thus heat, that is very agree- 
able to us in one degree, by a little 
increase of it, proves no ordinary 
torment; and the most pleasant of 
all sensible objects, light itself, if 
there be too much of it, if increased 
beyond a due proportion to our eyes, 
causes a very painful sensation; 
w^hich is wisely and favorably so or- 
dered by nature, that when any ob- 
ject does by the vehemency of its op- 
eration disorder the instruments of 
sensation, w^hose structure cannot 
but be very nice and delicate, w^e 
might, by the pain, be warned to 
withdraw before the organ be quite 
put out of order, and be so unfitted 
for its proper function for the fu- 
ture." 

28 



THE PROGRESS OF MAN. 

These considerations indicate that nat- 
ural causes subject to the control of man may 
be made to contribute either directly or in- 
directly to his ultimate welfare and progress 
and that causes not subject to human control 
naturally conserve if they do not contribute 
to that end. 

Therefore, natural causes are not essen- 
tially detrimental to human progress. 

Whence it appears, that natural causes, 
by and of themselves, tend neither to improve 
nor to impair the progress of man. 

This means that the effects of natural 

causes upon human progress are determined 

solely by the conduct of man and from this 

there follov^s the proposition that: 

The conduct of man considered 
in relation to its ultimate effect upon 
human progress is the only proper 
basis for adequate distinctions of 
good and evil. 

29 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

This same proposition is taught at least 
by implication in the Book of Genesis where 
it is written that: 

**And out of the ground made 
the LORD God to grow^ every tree 
that is pleasant to the sight, and 
good for food; the tree of life also in 
the midst of the garden, and the tree 
of knowledge of good and evil." 

''And the LORD God com- 
manded the man, saying. Of every 
tree of the garden thou mayest free- 
ly eat: 

But of the tree of the knowl- 
edge of good and evil, thou shalt not 
eat of it; for in the day that thou eat- 
est thereof thou shalt surely die." 

It is also w^ritten that man ate of the for- 
bidden fruit and thus gained a know^ledge of 
good and evil. 

This must mean that man was not con- 
scious of any distinctions of good and evil un- 
til he had become active in the pursuit of things 
not provided by the bounty of nature. 

30 



ADAM AND EVE. 

Interpreted less abstractly the conduct of 
Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden means 
that they had been moved or tempted by a 
spirit vv^hich prompted escape from the ennui 
of a purposeless existence: 

In this connection Thoreau stated. 

* 'Undoubtedly the very tedium 
and ennui w^hich presume to have 
exhausted the variety and the joys 
of life are as old as Adam." 

Also, concerning this same condition the 

theologian J. F. Clarke expressed himself as 

f ollow^s : 

**The dreadful disease of ennui, 
of life-weariness, attacks all who 
have no aim, no permanent pur- 
pose." 

Now, to the spirit that prompted Adam 
and Eve to escape from the ennui of their orig- 
inal condition men have always been prone 
to attribute all evils which have befallen them. 

31 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

This, manifestly, is equivalent to a gen- 
eral recognition of the condition that man could 
not have been conscious of any distinctions of 
good and evil except through the action he 
had taken to advance his welfare. 

Since distinctions of good and evil must 
be based on human conduct they naturally 
apply to the purposes of man. Accordingly, 
it is here understood that: 

A good purpose is one that conserves or 
promotes the ultimate welfare and progress of 
mankind. 

An evil purpose, being the opposite of 
good, is one that is detrimental to human wel- 
fare and progress. 

Every purpose that is not evil may fairly 
be considered good because, if not injurious, 
it must at least conserve the welfare and prog- 
ress of man or be without practical signify 
icance. 

32 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER III. 

PREDOMINANCE OF GOOD PURPOSES. 

In the course of human events, what con- 
stitutes a good or an evil purpose is generally 
a matter of opinion based on sensations and 
emotions produced by immediate or impend- 
ing pleasure or pain and subject to serious 
change in the increasing light of experience. 

But even though this is the general rule 
it is nevertheless true that the purposes of 
man when considered in relation to his gen- 
eral welfare and progress are subject to certain 
fundamental conditions which may be devel- 
oped from observation, experience, science 
and history in the following manner: 

33 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The achievement of a good purpose and 
particularly one that tends to the immediate 
promotion of human w^elfare and progress 
naturally creates, as is well known, not only a 
desire to repeat it but also a disposition to 
achieve other purposes of the same general 
character. 

This is recognized by St. Matthewr in the 

passage: 

**Even so every good tree bring- 
eth forth good fruit.'* 

The same tendency of good purposes is 
also beautifully expressed by the eminent di- 
vine G. P. Fisher thus: 

**One must be good in order to 
to do good ; but it is a case where the 
fountain is deepened by the outflow 
of its waters." 

Whence the ethical proposition: 

Good purposes, by reason of 
their satisfactory consequences, are 
persistent and prolific. 

34 



CORRECTION OF EVIL. 

Again, although men may and do yield 
to temptation it is well known that every 
normal man is instinctively opposed to what- 
ever violates his natural sense of justice and to 
w^hatever he thinks is inimical to his welfare 
and progress. And this is especially the case 
wrhenever his interests are threatened or in- 
vaded by the purposes of other men. Thus it 
is that evil purposes tend to create counter pur- 
poses which latter being opposed to evil are 
entitled to be considered good. 

Whence the ethical proposition: 

Evil purposes, by reason of 
their unsatisfactory consequences, 
tend to bring about their ow^n cor- 
rection. 

Now, it must be conceded that the ef- 
fective progress which man has made to date 
could not have been attained without the pre- 
dominance of his good purposes. 

35 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

This predominance is recognized by Sol- 
omon in the Proverb : 

**The evil bovsr before the good; 
and the wicked at the gates of the 
righteous." 

From these considerations and since in 

all such matters man must judge the future 

by the past there may be affirmed the ethical 

proposition: 

Good purposes, taken as a 
whole, must prevail in the end over 
all that are evil. 

The general process by w^hich man has 
made progress by virtue of this important prop- 
osition may be indicated thus: 

Man being comparatively weak, slow^ 
and defenseless by nature, advanced his safe- 
ty and therefore his physical w^elfare by the 
invention and use of w^eapons. By means of 
various implements he made improvements in 
the quality of his food and in its preparation; 

36 



COURSE OF PROGRESS. 

this advanced his physical welfare because it 
improved his sources of pleasure and contrib- 
uted to that general condition w^hich, judged 
by experience, makes his powers of endurance, 
as a rule, greater than that of the lower ani- 
mals. Being naturally unprotected man, by use 
of weapons and implements, provided himself 
with clothing and shelter; this advanced his 
physical welfare because the inconvenience of 
those desirable things w^ould not be tolerated 
unless it were more than compensated by the 
pleasure, comfort and protection they afford. 

In addition to the physical progress in- 
dicated, man has advanced his intellectual 
welfare by the acquisition of knowledge 
which alleviates fear of the unknown and en- 
ables him to mitigate his sufferings; by im- 
provement in mental discipline w^hich gives 
him better control of his natural propensities 

37 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and of means for achievement of his purposes; 
also by the gradual development of those so- 
cial, moral, intellectual and spiritual quali- 
ties which give refinement to his desires and 
tastes and at the same time make more avail- 
able the means for their gratification. 

To develop the details of this general 
process so as to show the relations of good and 
evil purposes through long periods of time is 
one of the most important duties of the his- 
torian. 

Until quite recently this duty was per- 
formed as indicated by the follow^ing quota- 
tion from the historian Buckle: 

'*The unfortunate peculiarity 
of the history of man is, that al- 
though its separate parts have been 
examined w^ith considerable ability, 
hardly any one has attempted to 
combine them into a whole, and as- 
certain the way in which they are 
connected with each other." 

38 



HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. 

And yet history abounds -with evidence 
of the ultimate predominance of good over 
evil purposes. 

The evil purposes of the enemies of 
Socrates which resulted in his death gave to 
the doctrines of that great man an influence 
that otherwise they would not have obtained. 
And to this influence is due much of the moral 
progress that has since been made. 

The evil purposes of the money changers 
wrho had been driven from the temple, aided 
by the treachery of Iscariot and abetted by 
the wrongful attitude of Pilate, culminated in 
the Crucifixion. 

That ghastly and revolting episode, be- 
cause of the moral progress w^hich by that 
time had been made and by reason of the un- 
exampled character and conduct of the inno- 
cent victim, outraged all sense of natural jus- 

39 

_4_ 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tice. It thus gave to the precepts and to the 
example of Christ that emphasis without which 
his doctrines could not so benignly and so per- 
sistently have influenced the purposes of fu- 
ture generations. 

The purposes of the Inquisition, because 
of the high emotions w^hich their cruelty 
aroused at the time and afterwards, had a 
beneficial influence upon the later purposes of 
men and, on the w^hole, have resulted in more 
good than evil. 

The evil purposes involved in human 
slavery gave rise to the counter purposes w^hich 
brought forth abolition to the benefit both of 
master and of man. 

Alcoholic indulgence, by reason of its 
bad effects and the evil purposes it engenders 
continually tends to bring about its own effect- 
ual prohibition. 

40 



HISTORICAL EVIDENCE. 

Purposes for exploitation of savage races 
generally open the way to achievement of pur- 
poses by them and by others for their eventual 
betterment. 

The evil purposes of oppression that 
brought about the war of the American Revo- 
lution and events connected with that conflict 
resulted in establishment of higher moral 
principles and ideals and, generally, in greater 
progress than wrould seem to have been pos- 
sible by any other process at the time. 

Also, in other important cases it is known 
that evils attending achievement of warlike 
purposes have been temporary w^hile the ben- 
efits are lasting and cumulative. This is be- 
cause of the training, discipline, experience 
and issues which tended to enhancement of 
hardihood, courage, efficiency, self-sacrifice 
and honor and because of the good influences 

41 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of those improved qualities upon the imme- 
diate and subsequent purposes of man. And, 
there is not, as in the nature of things there 
cannot be, any conclusive evidence that the 
same is not true of every war that ever hsts 
been waged. In addition to this the fear of 
aggression naturally prompts improvements 
in defensive appliances and this leads to more 
efficient implements of industry. The desire 
for aggression has the same general effect. 
As a result there can be no doubt that the 
stimulus of w^ar has contributed largely to in- 
dustrial progress. And even though appear- 
ances may be to the contrary there is reason 
to believe that in course of time this recipro- 
cal improvement in armament and implement 
will make w^arf are impracticable and thus give 
to peaceful avocations lasting benefits which, 

42 



GENERAL PROGRESS. 

but for war, would never have been developed. 

That the historical evidence cited indi- 
cates the general trend of events in every con- 
flict between good and evil may readily be 
shown. 

All experience indicates that the general 
effect of natural causes and conditions upon 
the welfare and progress of man depends upon 
the use made of them as means for achieve- 
ment of human purposes. 

Therefore, the general w^elf are and prog- 
ress of man beyond that accorded by nature 
to the low^er animals must be the result of 
human agency. 

This means, in effect, that every man as 
an intelligent agent is what he is because of 
the good and evil purposes of himself, of those 
who are with him and of those who have gone 

43 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

before. And it must be conceded that the 
good purposes of man, taken as a whole, from 
the beginning to the present time have im- 
proved his condition and his character and ad- 
vanced his general v^elfare as against all the 
evil purposes that have ever been achieved and 
in despite of all adverse influences vvrhich may 
have been contained in his natural environ- 
ment. Consequently, even though the ele- 
ments of evil, instead of being limited to hu- 
man conduct as was shown, should inhere in 
natural causes and conditions, it is certain that 
man has made progress. 

Therefore, those wrho may not concede 
that all distinctions of good and evil must be 
based on human conduct must admit the prop- 
osition that: 

Good things, as a whole, must 
predominate all things that are evil. 

44 



CONFLICT OF GOOD AND EVIL. 

Concerning the conflict between good 

and evil the theologian Dr. Horace Bushnell 

thus expressed himself: 

**No state of virtue is com- 
plete, ho^vever total the virtue, save 
as it is won by a conflict with evil." 

The same condition is described by the 

historian James Anthony Froude thus: 

* 'Great movements which are 
unresisted flow^ violently on and 
waste themselves in extravagance 
and destruction; and revolutions 
which are to mark a step in the ad- 
vance of mankind need always the 
discipline of opposition until the 
baser parts are beaten out of them." 

The doctrine of moral evolution which 
was developed by the philosopher Herbert 
Spencer may be interpreted to mean that hu- 
man conduct is a process whereby man is 
adapted to the conditions of his environment 
and that this adaptation is at its best when it 

45 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

contributes most in the end to human welfare 
and progress ; also, that this process is as nat- 
ural as the adaptation of vegetable and animal 
organisms to the vicissitudes of environment. 
This doctrine is manifestly not in con- 
flict with the quotations cited from theology 
and history and is in entire agreement with all 
that has been developed concerning the pre- 
dominance of the good over the evil. 



46 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER IV. 

CAUSE, EFFECT AND PRINCIPLE. 

All experience shows that achievement 
of any purpose consists of the production of an 
intended effect by the systematic application 
of cause. 

All conceptions of cause and effect and 
of their relations to each other are based upon 
the events of existence. 

An event is any kind of a change in cor- 
poreal, vital or intellectual existence which has 
actually come to pass. 

A cause is anything which brings about 
or w^hich has the ability to bring about an 
event. 

An effect is an event that is known to 
have been brought about by some cause. 

47 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Creation is what would happen should an 

event come to pass w^ithout being the effect of 

any cause whatever. 

According to Protagoras: 

*'Man is the measure of all 
things: of those which are, that they 
are; of those which are not, that 
they are not." 

This applied to causes may be interpreted 
to mean that only those by w^hich man is or can 
be affected can be known to him and that no 
others can or need be considered. As so un- 
derstood the quotation, wrhile somewhat para- 
doxical, is generally recognized as being true. 

The only known causes are: 

The inherent pow^ers of inert 
matter. 

The properties of plants. 

The faculties and propensi- 
ties of animals. 

The qualifications of intelli- 
gent agents. 

48 



ENERGIES OF EXISTENCE 

Energy is ability of a cause to produce 
effect and is actual or potential according as 
the cause is or is not in operation. 

The energies of existence classified with 

respect to their causes are: 

Corporeal Energies: 

All those resulting directly 
from the intrinsic properties of inert 
matter. 

Vital Energies: 

All that result directly from the 
organization of matter into a condi- 
tion of physical vitality. 

Intellectual Energies: 

Those that are due to the es- 
sential qualities of the mind and 
bring about all mental processes. 

Trancendental Energies: 

Those assumed to arise from 
ideal qualities of real or imaginary 
things in order to account for effects 
or events otherwise inexplicable. 

49 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 

A cause is adequate with respect to a 
change in existence or an effect when it has the 
quaUty and quantity of energy necessary to 
bring about that change. The only proper test 
of the adequacy of the cause is the production 
of the effect. 

A Principle is here treated as a general 
natural regulation without which systematic 
application of causes to achievement of pur- 
poses would be impracticable. 

The general principles necessary for 
achievement of the purposes of man may be 
developed as follows: 

The inherent pow^ers of inert matter, 
properties of plants, faculties and propensities 
of animals and qualifications of intelligent 
agents are all knoAvn by experience to be effi- 
cient causes, each able to influence causes of 
its own as w^ell as of every other class. Thus 
it is that, as is w^ell know^n, the systematic ap- 

50 



CONDITIONS OF ACHIEVEMENT. 

plication of any given cause makes it necessary 
to consider not only the given cause but also 
its relations to every other cause of the same 
or of a different class. 

For convenience of reference the well 
known conditions necessary for the proper ap- 
plication of a given cause to achievement of a 
purpose may be stated thus : 

1 . The given cause itself must be 
brought writhin the effective control of the per- 
son who prosecutes the purpose. 

2. The given cause must be isolated 
from the influence of every other cause which 
cannot be controlled and by which the pur- 
pose might otherwise be defeated. 

3. Every cause, whether of the same or 
of a different class, from which the given cause 
cannot be isolated must be under effective 
control. 

51 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Now, should it be possible for a change in 
existence to occur without any cause whatever 
then this change might arbitrarily affect any 
given cause in immediate use for achievement 
of some purpose and this w^ould violate the 
first condition. Should the arbitrary change 
in existence affect any cause from wrhich the 
given cause had been isolated it might break 
down the isolation and the second condition 
would be violated. Should the uncaused 
change affect any cause from which the given 
cause could not be isolated then all those 
causes w^ould not be under effective control 
and this would violate the third condition. 
Should a change in existence be brought about 
by an inadequate cause then part of the change 
would be without any cause and all the condi- 
tions w^ould be violated for the reasons stated. 
Therefore, the systematic application of 

52 



CAUSATION AND REGULATION. 

any cause to achievement of any purpose re- 
quires that an effect without an adequate cause 
shall be impossible. 

This means that achievement of purpose 
is impracticable without what is known as: 

The Principle of Causation: 

There must be an adequate 
cause for every possible effect or 
event. 

Should the same cause or a similar cause 
under the same or similar conditions pro- 
duce different effects then the difference in 
effect would be an effect for which there 
w^ould be no cause and this would violate the 
Principle of Causation. 

Therefore, achievement of purpose is im- 
practicable without what is called : 

The Principle of Regulation : 

Similar causes under similar 
conditions must invariably produce 
similar effects. 

53 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Should an effect be changed by change 
in time or space, all other conditions and rela- 
tions remaining the same, then the Principle 
of Regulation would be void. 

Whence, achievement of purpose requires 
the truth of what may be styled : 

The Principle of Stability: 

The effect of a cause is inde- 
pendent of absolute position in time 
or space. 

Matter without ability * to produce effect 

cannot be known and need not be considered. 

Consequently, should any item of corporeal 

existence be subject to increase or diminution 

w^ithout transfer of material from or to some 

other item then control of the energies of that 

item would be impracticable. One instance 

of this wrould indicate its possibility in every 

case and leave no dependable physical basis 

for systematic application of cause. 

54 



CONSERVATION OF MATTER. 

Now, the systematic application of any 
cause without a dependable physical basis is 
impracticable. 

Therefore, an essential condition of the 
achievement of a purpose is: 

The Principle of Conservation of Matter: 

The sum total of all corporeal 
substances is constant. 

The systematic application of a given 
cause to achievement of a purpose involves, of 
course, effective control of its energy. In or- 
der that this may be practicable the following 
conditions must obtain: 

1 . Effective control of the energy as to 
action, inaction and direction. 

2. Isolation of the energy from every other 
energy that is beyond control. 

3. Effective control of every energy from 
which the energy of the given cause cannot be 
isolated. 

55 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Should it be possible for the energy of 
any given cause to increase or diminish in and 
of itself and without relation to any other 
cause then there might be arbitrary fluctua- 
tions vsrhich would make impracticable effec- 
tive control of the energy, violate the first con- 
dition cited and, theoretically at least, make 
not only the given cause but every cause of the 
same class unfit for use in the systematic pro- 
duction of any intended effect. This w^ould 
mean that in the achievement of human pur- 
poses all such causes should be excluded. But 
this exclusion, by reason of the numerous and 
close relations that are knovvrn to prevail 
among causes of different classes, would its- 
self be the object of a purpose involving the 
causes in question. As a consequence, the is- 
olation of controllable energies required in 
the achievement of any given purpose might 

56 



CORRELATION OF ENERGY. 

be impracticable and the second condition be 
violated. This would mean, of course, that 
there would not be effective control of energies 
from which controllable energies could not be 
isolated and this would violate the third con- 
dition. 

Therefore, it is essential to achievement 
of human purposes that an absolute change 
of energy shall be impossible. 

This naturally requires that no change in 
the energy of any cause shall be possible ex- 
cept through transfer of equivalent energy to 
or from some other cause. 

Whence achievement of human purposes 
is impracticable without what is known as: 

The Principle of Correlation: 

The exact amount of energy 
that is acquired or given up by any 
cause must invariably be given up 
or acquired by some other cause. 

57 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

An increase in the energy of a given 
cause without an equivalent diminution of the 
energy of some other cause would be a change 
in existence without an adequate cause and 
violate the Principle of Causation. A decrease 
in the energy of a given cause without trans- 
fer to some other cause would be equivalent 
to an arbitrary decrease in energy, prevent 
the cause from producing similar effects un- 
der similar conditions and violate the Princi- 
ple of Regulation. 

Whence, as might also have been derived 
from the principle of Correlation, achieve- 
ment of human purposes would be impracti- 
cable without what is called: 

The Principle of Conservation of Energy: 

The total of the actual and po- 
tential energies of existence is in- 
variable. 



58 



PRINCIPLES AND VITAL CAUSES. 

The six principles which have been de- 
veloped as indispensable to achievement of 
the purposes of man are the same that have 
been shown by processes of physical science 
to be true for all causes inherent in inert mat- 
ter. 

Whether the principles of Causation, 
Regulation, Stability, Correlation and Conser- 
vation of Energy are true for the properties of 
plants and for the faculties and propensities of 
animals has not been determined by science 
with the mathematical accuracy possible with 
purely physical causes; but short of arithmet- 
ical precision, there is abundant evidence that 
those five principles should be recognized as 
true for the vital causes mentioned. 

Also, the testimony of science is to the 
effect that the principles of Causation, Regu- 

59 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

lation and Stability are true for all intellec- 
tual qualifications: 

The general attitude of science towards 
the correlation and conservation of intellec- 
tual energies is indicated by the following quo- 
tations from an appendix by Professor Alex- 
ander Bain to a treatise on The Conservation 
of Energy by Professor Balfour Stewart. 

**That there is a definite equiv- 
alence between mental manifesta- 
tions and physical forces, the same 
as between the physical forces them- 
selves, is, I think, conformable to all 
the facts, although liable to peculiar 
difficulties in the way of decisive 
proof: 

I. The mental manifestations 
are in exact proportion to their 
physical supports. 

If the doctrine of the thorough- 
going connection of mind and body 
is good for anything, it must go this 
length. There must be a numerical- 
ly-proportioned rise and fall of the 
two together. 

60 



CORRELATION OF ENERGIES 

Further along he states that: 

**II. There remains another ap- 
plication of the doctrine, perhaps 
equally interesting to contemplate, 
and more within my special line of 
study. I mean the correlation of the 
mental forces among themselves 
( still viewed in the con j oint arrange- 
ment) . Just as we assign limits to 
mind as a whole, by a reference to 
the grant of physical expenditure, in 
oxidization etc., for the department, 
so we must assign limits to the dif- 
ferent phases or modes of mental 
work — thought, feeling and so on — 
according to the share allotted to 
each; so that, while the mind as a 
w^hole may be stinted by the de- 
mands of the non-mental functions, 
each separate manifestation is 
bounded by the requirements of the 
others. This is an inevitable conse- 
quence of the general principle, and 
equally receives the confirmation of 
experience. 

The difficulties in the w^ay of conclusive 

proof by ordinary scientific processes of the 

61 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

general correlation and conservation of all 
physical, vital and intellectual energies, which 
were referred to by Professor Bain, would 
seem to be insuperable because of the com- 
plications involved and the impossibility of ob- 
taining the necessary exact data. 

But if it can be shown that an effect or 
event has been brought about w^hich could not 
conceivably have been produced w^ithout the 
general conservation and inter-correlation of 
all existing energies then the principles of con- 
servation and correlation of energies may be 
recognized as having universal application. 

Now, there can be no question that the 
w^elfare of man has been advanced as the gen- 
eral result of all the numerous, diverse, good 
and evil purposes that he has achieved from 
the beginning until the present time. And it 

62 



GENERAL PROOF OF PRINCIPLES, 

has been shown that this advancement is due 
to the systematic and natural predominance 
of good over evil purposes. 

This means that systematic and success- 
ful application of causes of every kind must 
have been made, each in relation to and under 
the influence of causes and energies of every 
class. 

Therefore, causes of every kind may be 
regarded as having been systematically and 
successfully applied to the achievement of a 
single purpose that had for its object the ad- 
vancement of human welfare. 

Consequently, the systematic application 
of every known cause to the achievement of 
a single purpose may be regarded as practi- 
cable. 

But every one of the six principles de- 
veloped was shown to be indispensable to the 

63 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

systematic application of causes and their en- 
ergies to achievement of human purposes. 
Whence, it appears that: 

The principles of Conservation and Cor- 
relation, in so far as man can be concerned, 
may be accepted as true for all physical, vital 
and intellectual energies. 



G4 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER V. 

LAW AND ORDER. 

A law is here considered as a rule of nat- 
ural action in virtue of which a certain cause, 
whenever and wherever placed under certain 
conditions, must invariably produce a certain 
effect. 

The principal laws w^hich have been so 
far developed may, for convenience, be classi- 
fied vvrith respect to the energies w^hich they 
control, as follows: 

THE LAWS OF PHYSICAL ACTION. 

The Law of Gravitation: 

Any two material bodies con- 
tinually attract each other with a 
definite force proportional to the 
product of their masses divided by 
the square of the distance between 
their centers. 

65 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The Laws of Motion and Force: 

Any material body acted upon 
by a force and then left free and un- 
disturbed will invariably move with 
uniform velocity in a straight line in 
the direction of the action of the 
force. 

Any force while acting on a 
body for a given time invariably pro- 
duces a definite velocity proportion- 
al to the intensity of the force divid- 
ed by the mass of the body. 

To the action of every force 
there is invariably an equal and op- 
posite reaction. 

The Laws of Physical Energy: 

The amount of energy required 
to produce a certain velocity in a 
body is equal to one half the mass 
of the body multiplied by the square 
of the velocity. 

The amount of energy re- 
quired to bring a moving body to 
rest is equal to the square of its veloc- 
ity multiplied by one half its mass. 

In addition to the laws cited, there are 

numerous others, such as those which relate 

66 



NATURAL LAWS. 

to inertia and rotation, and such as the laws 
by which the strength, rigidity, elasticity and 
flexibility of materials are governed, which 
need not be set forth here. 

The Laws of Chemical Affinity: 

Any kinds of matter that can 
combine will, under the same con- 
ditions, invariably unite in definite 
proportion and form the same chem- 
ical compound. 

TTie Laws of Chemical Energy: 

The same chemical combina- 
tion of the same quantities of the 
same kinds of matter invariably lib- 
erates the same amount of energy. 

Disintegration of the same 
quantity of the same chemical com- 
pound invariably stores up the same 
amount of energy. 

The systematic transformation of chem- 
ical into physical energy is made generally 
possible by numerous laws relating to develop- 
ment and application of heat. 

67 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Vital action is understood to be a spe- 
cial manifestation of chemical affinity and 
chemical energy. Its general laws are: 

The Laws of Natural Selection: 

Any species of plant or animal 
under conditions unsuited to its na- 
ture but not fatal naturally under- 
goes such changes and acquires such 
additional qualities as tend to adapt 
it to its environment. 

Competition between different 
species or between individuals of the 
same species under conditions not 
generally destructive naturally en- 
hances hardihood and efficiency. 

Every plant or animal under 
conditions suitable for its propaga- 
tion naturally transmits to its pos- 
terity certain inherited qualities to- 
gether with other qualities acquired 
by itself. 

The Laws of Sensation: 

All those rules of organic ac- 
tion by which similar animal organ- 
isms from similar causes under simi- 
lar conditions naturally experience 
similar sensations. 

68 



LAWS OF INTELLECTUAL ACTION. 

The Laws of Thought: 

All those rules of intellectual 
action by virtue of which men of 
similar qualifications, starting with 
know^ledge of certain facts and 
truths, do, entirely by mental proc- 
esses, acquire know^ledge of other 
facts and truths. 

The Laws of Emotion: 

All those rules of mental action 
according to which men of similar 
qualifications under the influence 
of similar sensation and thought nat- 
urally experience similar emotions. 

Intellectual action is here understood to 
sustain invariable but not generally determin- 
ate relations to vital action. 

Since any cause that is governed by a law 
must invariably produce the same or a similar 
effect w^henever and wherever it may be 
placed under the same or similar conditions it 
is evident that those conditions must be such 
as to bring the cause into proper initial action 

60" 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and to insure production of the effect by ac- 
curate direction and control of the operation. 
This means that: 

Every law, by its own condi- 
tions, must be self -enforcing. 

The first time any cause produces an ef- 
fect it must establish a self -enforcing law for 
the reason that, by the Principle of Regula- 
tion, the same or a similar cause w^henever and 
wherever placed under the same or similar 
conditions must invariably produce the same 
or a similar effect. 

Consequently, whenever a cause pro- 
duces an effect it must either establish a self- 
enforcing law or conform to one previously 
established by a similar cause under similar 

conditions. 

Whence, by the Principle of Regulation: 

All causes must act according 
to self -enforcing law. 

70 



CONDITIONS OF A LAW. 

The conditions under which any cause, 
subject to the terms of a self -enforcing law, 
may have produced an effect include and are 
limited to its relations to every other cause by 
which the effect had been or might have been 
influenced. For it is certain that every pos- 
sible influence of every other cause must be 
included and it is evident that there can be no 
occasion for the inclusion of anything else. 

The production of an effect except by a 
cause subject to certain conditions w^ould be 
equivalent to original creation and this, not be- 
ing conceivable, need not be considered here. 

Therefore, the action of every cause 
which can be conceived of as available for the 
achievement of a human purpose must be re- 
garded as subject to certain determining condi- 
tions. 

71 

-■6- 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

But it has been shown that the conditions 
under which any cause can produce an effect 
are limited to the influences of other causes. 

Therefore, the action or influence of more 
than a single cause is always necessary for 
the production of an effect. 

This means that: 

Every law, by virtue of its own 
conditions, must insure the co-opera- 
tion of two or more causes. 

That this proposition has not always been 
given the attention its importance seems to de- 
serve is indicated by the following remark of 
Sir William Hamilton: 

**I have already noticed to you 
the error of philosophers in suppos- 
ing that anything can have a single 
cause." 

In view of vsrhat has been stated it is evi- 
dent that in every case in which several causes 
come into co-operation and produce a single 

72 



ORDER. 

joint effect, that effect may be regarded as 
having been brought about by any one of the 
causes according to its own self-enforcing law, 
the conditions of which include the influences 
of all the others. 

Whence, by general principles of Reg- 
ulation and of Stability, it must be true that: 

Similar sets of respectively 
similar co-operative causes must in- 
variably come into action and pro- 
duce a similar joint effect w^henever 
and wrherever they are placed under 
similar conditions and in the same 
co-operative relations to one an- 
other. 

Order is here understood to be that gen- 
eral condition which prevails among several 
causes and the special conditions and relations 
under which they are placed, when all invaria- 
bly co-operate and produce the same single 
joint effect. 

73 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Rules of Order are special natural rules 
of relative action, reaction and inaction by vir- 
tue of which several definite causes invariably 
come into co-operation and produce a similar 
joint effect w^henever and wherever they are 
placed under similar extraneous conditions 
and in the same co-operative relations. 

From this definition the proposition last 

developed may be stated thus: 

Similar sets of respectively 
similar co-operative causes must in- 
variably come into action and pro- 
duce a similar joint effect w^henever 
and w^herever placed under similar 
rules of order. 

Since, as has been shown, every joint ef- 
fect of several causes may be regarded as the 
effect of any one of the causes acting accord- 
ing to its own self-enforcing law, rules of order 
may be treated as rules defining the conditions 
and relations under w^hich a given cause may 

74 



RULES OF ORDER. 

be depended upon to come into operation and 
produce a required effect. 

The rules of order under which causes co- 
operate are of incalculable number and va- 
riety. This is, of course, because of the close 
and efficient relations that prevail among 
causes and because of the many different com- 
binations of causes, conditions and relations 
under vv^hich they will produce joint effects. 

The rules of order that have been devel- 
oped and reduced to writing are classified, ac- 
cording to the phenomena to which they relate, 
under the heads of Astronomy, Physics, Me- 
chanics, Chemistry, Botany, Zoology, Meta- 
physics, Jurisprudence etc., and are available 
in the numerous treatises on those subjects as 
a theoretical basis for achievement of human 
purposes. 

7& 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The systematic application of causes to 
achievement of a single purpose through prin- 
ciples, laws and rules of order may be illustrat- 
ed practically thus: 

An engineer in designing a steam pile 
driver depends upon the six general principles 
of existence for control and isolation of the 
causes and energies he intends to use; he de- 
pends upon the lawrs of gravity and of motion 
and force and upon the ascertained strength, 
rigidity, elasticity and other qualities of vari- 
ous kinds of matter as being the same for sim- 
ilar materials; he also depends upon the chem- 
ical energies of fuel as the source of pov^er for 
the machine. With these as a basis he specifies 
certain rules of order wrhich he knows must be 
observed in the material, shape, dimensions 
and relative position of each part to the end 
that the completed machine when subjected to 

76 



RULES OF ORDER. 

certain conditions will come into action and 
deliver a powerful impact upon a pile. 

To make the machine thus designed the 
manufacturer must apply certain rules of order 
with respect to the tools and the materials he 
must use and in addition he must apply other 
rules of order necessary for the co-operation 
of his employes. 

The pile driver having been completed, is 
placed at the disposal of an organization of 
men who under certain rules of order must co- 
operate with one another to produce the effect 
for which the machine was designed and con- 
structed. 

Rules of order for the systematic co-op- 
eration of men must, of course, be based upon 
physical principles and laws but they all natur- 
ally depend directly upon the laws of sensa- 
tion, thought and emotion. 

77 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

With due regard to standard authority, 
sensation, thought and emotion, respectively, 
are here understood as indicated by the follow- 
ing definitions: 

Sensation is an immediate feeling of 
pleasure or of pain produced in the mind when- 
ever a cause perceptibly affects an organ of 
sense. 

This definition is based on the consider- 
ation that a sensation w^ithout any perceptible 
pleasure or pain would be without practical 
significance. 

Thought is that process by which the 
mind, entirely through the exercise of its own 
powers, acquires knowledge and improves its 
faculties and capacities. 

The only available data for processes of 
thought are: events of existence indicated by 
sensation; self evident propositions and cis- 
sumptions of the imagination. 

78 



SENSATION, THOUGHT AND EMOTION. 

Emotion is a state of mind brought about 
entirely by the action of the mind itself while 
under the influence of sensation, of thought or 
of both. 

The mental condition manifested through 
emotion is understood to be that by which the 
mind is moved to the determination of a pur- 
pose. This means that emotion is the state of 
mind through w^hich sensation and thought are 
given practical expression. 

Accordingly, the general practical rela- 
tions of sensation, thought and emotion to one 
another are understood to be that: 

The practical significance of a sensation 
depends upon the emotions it arouses, the na- 
ture of those emotions depends upon the state 
of the body and the qualifications of the mind; 
manifestations of emotion are determined by 
extraneous influences and processes o f 
thought. 

79 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Were the conduct of men determined en- 
tirely by sensation their co-operation might be 
gained through influence of natural conditions 
as in the case of animals when confronted with 
a common danger. But the action of a man 
is often w^idely different from w^hat might be 
expected from such influences. The reasons 
are, as already indicated, that the conduct of 
a man is determined by his emotions ; that these 
are continually influenced by fluctuations of 
sensation of w^hich an observer can have no 
definite knowledge; that emotions are also de- 
termined largely by propensities, peculiarities 
and habits of thought of which the man himself 
may not have adequate conceptions. 

This being true, it is manifest that in order 
that men may be brought to work systematic- 
ally and persistently towards a common object 



80 



CO-OPERATION OF MEN. 

they must be subjected to some general 
condition of power and scope sufficient to 
counteract those obscure and complicated in- 
fluences which affect their individual thoughts 
and emotions and tend to cause independent 
action. 

Now, the only general condition that can 
be depended upon to control the individual 
thoughts and emotions of a number of men suf- 
ficiently to bring about and maintain their sys- 
tematic co-operation is that w^hich conserves 
or advances or w^hich they believe will conserve 
or advance their individual and collective wel- 
fare. 

Whence, as is otherwise w^ell known, 
human welfare and progress affords the only 
practicable basis for rules of order by which the 
systematic co-operation of men can be effected. 



81 



LAW AND ORDER. 

« 

Law and Order is understood to be that 
general condition under which all causes in- 
volved must act and all effects must be produc- 
ed according to self-enforcing law^s and rules 
of order. 

The unbroken testimony of science is that 
all phenomena of physical, vital and intellec- 
tual existence come to pass according to law 
and rules of order and that there prevails 
among them a perfect state of universal self- 
enforcing Law^ and Order. 



82 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER VI. 

MEANS AND METHOD. 

Means is here understood to include: 

Every cause, agency, truth, 
fact, condition or relation that is 
available for achievement of the pur- 
poses of man. 

The means available for achievement of 
human purposes may be summarized thus: 
Existing Causes: 

Inherent pow^ers of inert mat- 
ter; properties of plants; faculties 
and propensities of animals; quali- 
fications of intelligent agents. 

General Principles of Existence. 

Conditions and Relations! under Which 
causes w^ill come into operation. 

Laws of Physical, Vital and Intellectual 
action. 

Rules of Order under which causes wU 
come into action and produce joint 
effects. 

83 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Method is here regarded as the manner 

in which means are applied to the achievement 

of purposes or, more explicitly as: 

The systematic procedure by 
which a purpose is determined in the 
mind and adequate means are devel- 
oped, selected, obtained and applied 
to accomplishment of the object. 

Analytical method is that by which a con- 
ception, material body or an event or effect is 
separated into its constituent elements or 
causes. 

Synthetic method is the procedure by 
which elements or causes are combined so as 
to produce a certain conception, material body, 
effect or event. 

The method employed in any given Ccise 
may be analytical or synthetic or it may in- 
volve both kinds according to the nature of the 
purpose and the known means available for 
its achievement. 

84 



METHOD. 

Methods available for achievement of pur- 
poses relating to practical affairs have for 
their theoretical basis the following general 

process: 

Formation of some conception 
of a final effect. 

Discovery of all subordinate 
effects which must be produced. 

Development of the means nec- 
essaryfor production of all required 
effects. 

Ascertainment that adequate 
means are obtainable. 

Determination of the purpose 
in the mind with due regard to ob- 
tainable means. 

Isolation of all the required 
causes from every influence that 
might othervsrise defeat the purpose. 

Installation of the necessary 
causes under such conditions, re- 
lations and rules of order that they 
will come into proper co-operation 
and produce the final intended ef- 
fect. 

85 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

In this general procedure it will be ob- 
served that, by definition, the discovery of 
subordinate effects and development of nec- 
essary means are analytical processes vv^hile 
all the others are synthetic. 

The theoretical procedure which has 
been outlined may be illustrated by the f ollow^- 
ing practical examples : 

A man from his observation and experi- 
ence concerning structures forms a general 
conception of a building. 

He prepares plans and specifications and 
thus discovers the subordinate effects that 
must be produced and develops the means re- 
quired to complete the structure. 

Then, should he be inclined to proceed 
further, he would first make sure that ade- 
quate means would be obtainable. 

This having been done, he would resolve 

86 



METHOD. 

to construct the building and would thus de- 
termine the purposes in his mind. 

He would then isolate the required 
causes by providing a site, enclosing it if nec- 
essary, and assembling upon it suitable men 
and materials free from outside influences. 

Finally he would install the men and ma- 
terials under conditions, relations and rules of 
order necessary to bring all into proper co- 
operation and produce the structure intended. 

This procedure, however, would apply in 
strictness only to the first building of the kind 
that this man might erect since, in case of a 
second similar structure, the analytical proc- 
esses of discovering subordinate effects and 
developing necessary means would not be 
required. 

In case of a farmer who, at the beginning 
of a season, with sufficient means at hand de- 

87 

-7- 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

termines to reproduce a certain crop by meth- 
ods previously employed the analytical proc- 
esses for discovery of subordinate effects and 
development of necessary means would not be 
required because the effects v^ould be known 
and the means w^ould be at hand. 

Therefore, in this and in every similar 
instance all methods would be synthetic. And 
the same is true of all purposes relating to prac- 
tical affairs which are repeatedly achieved by 
the same person with the same means and by 
the same methods. 

Thus, in the ordinary recurrent purposes 
of practical life the natural tendency of ex- 
perience is to reduce analytical processes to a 
minimum and, consequently, to lead prac- 
tical men to depend more and more upon syn- 
thetic methods for the achievement of their 
purposes. 

88 



ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 

The metaphysical distinction between 

analysis and synthesis is explained by Sir 

William Hamilton thus: 

*'In so far, therefore, as philos- 
ophy is the research of causes, the 
one necessary condition of its pos- 
sibility is the decomposition of ef- 
fects into their constituted causes. 
This is the fundamental procedure 
of philosophy, and is called by a 
Greek term Analysis. But though 
analysis may be the fundamental 
procedure, it is still only a means to- 
ward an end. We analyze only that 
w^e may comprehend: and w^e com- 
prehend only inasmuch as w^e are 
able to reconstruct in thought the 
complex effects which we have an- 
alyzed into their elements. This 
mental reconstruction is, therefore, 
the final, consummative procedure 
of philosophy, and it is known by 
the Greek term Synthesis.'* 

This abstract distinction, however, is 
not sufficient for purposes of practical phil- 
osophy because it limits the knowledge of 

89 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

causes to ability to reconstruct in thought 
alone the complex effects that have been an- 
alyzed into their elements; whereas, in order 
that the knowledge shall be complete, it must 
confer ability to reconstruct the effect in actual 
practice. 

In addition to this much know^ledge of 
great practical importance is acquired entire- 
ly by synthetic processes in the prosecution 
of experimental and tentative purposes w^ith a 
view^ to improvement and development of 
means and methods. 

It is well known that while sets of re- 
spectively similar causes acting under certain 
laws and rules of order must produce similar 
effects, it is also true that: 

The same effect may generally 
be produced by different causes act- 
ing under different rules of order. 

It is in virtue of this important propo- 

90 



IMPROVEMENT. 

sition that men, under the changing conditions 
of practical life, are enabled, by modification 
of means and methods to reproduce effects 
necessary for their safety, subsist ance and com- 
fort and thus adapt themselves to the vicissi- 
tudes of their environment. 

Also, were the proposition not true, then 
there would be but one way of doing anything 
and all the numerous and great improvements 
in means and methods which contribute so 
largely to human progress w^ould be impracti- 
cable; such as, for instance, improvements in 
means and methods available for agriculture, 
mining, manufacture and transportation. 

Another great source of progress is to be 
found in the proposition that: 

Different effects may be pro- 
duced by the same or respectively 
similar causes under different rules 
of order. 

91 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

By virtue of this proposition it is often 
practicable to increase to a wonderful degree 
the number and importance of the purposes 
that may readily be achieved by the same ob- 
tainable means. For illustration: 

The physical energy of gravitation, by 
means of an elevated body of water, is used 
for the production of heat, light and electricty 
and for purposes of irrigation, manufacture 
and transportation; the chemical energies of 
combustion are used for the same purposes 
and for numerous others -widely different in 
kind and the same is true of the properties of 
plants and animals. And above all, the quali- 
fications of intelligent agents may be applied 
to all the innumerable purposes necessary for 
the conservation and advancement of human 
welfare. 



92 



RESOURCES. 

That the resources known to be avail- 
able for achievement of the purposes of man 
are commensurate with his actual and poten- 
tial ability to make efficient use of them is in- 
dicated by the abundance, diversity and ef- 
ficiency of causes; by the manifold and inti- 
mate relations that prevail among physical, 
vital and intellectual causes and their energies ; 
by the general principles by which causes and 
their energies are conserved and controlled; 
by the incalculable number of conditions and 
relations under w^hich causes will come into 
action; by the self -enforcing laws by which all 
causes and energies are governed; by the in- 
numerable rules of order under which causes 
will come into co-operation; by the variety of 
methods by which different causes may be 
subjected to different rules of order and thus 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

be made to produce similar effects; by the dif- 
ferent effects which, by change of method, 
may be brought about by similar causes. 

This provision of means and methods, 
however, is not more wonderful than the con- 
dition that howsoever ignorant and imperfect 
man may be; howsoever great may be his 
blunders; howsoever disastrous may be his 
conduct he will invariably be brought back 
into the proper course of progress by the mar- 
velous provision that : 

Good things, as a whole, must 
predominate all that are evil. 



^4 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER VII. 

INTELLECTUAL EFFICIENCY. 

Intellectual efficiency is understood to 
be that state or condition of the mind which 
qualifies a man in disposition and ability for 
the systematic application of means and meth- 
od to achievement of purposes without pres- 
ent or immediate regard to distinctions of good 
and evil. 

The only knowrn criterion by w^hich the 
intellectual efficiency of a man can be properly 
judged is to be found in the purposes he has 
actually achieved. 

Now, in order that the achievements of 
a man may be a proper measure of his intel-^ 
lectual efficiency he must, of course, be free 
to respond to the influences brought to bear 
on his mind and must not be unduly deprived 
of suitable means. 

95 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

For this reason, in treating of intellec- 
tual efficiency, it will be assumed that no man 
is improperly restrained and that every man 
can obtain adequate means for the proper 
achievement of every purpose w^ithin the range 
of his mental capacities and faculties. 

Accordingly, intellectual efficiency will 
be treated as that state or condition of mind 
which manifests itself in the systematic 
achievement of purposes. 

The qualifications which constitute in- 
tellectual efficiency are understood to in- 
volve, either directly or indirectly, every 
elemental capacity, faculty and propensity of 
mind; for otherwise there would be certain 
qualities for which there w^ould be no use and 
this is inconsistent w^ith the general economy 
of existence as know^n to man. 



96 



INTELLECTUAL QUALIFICATIONS. 

Observation and experience, however, 
show that the elements of mind Uke the ele- 
ments of physical existence must enter into 
various combinations in order to be available 
for the systematic achievement of purposes. 

Therefore, the intellectual qualifications 
necessary for achievement of human purposes 
may be regarded generally as combinations 
of elemental properties, faculties and propen- 
sities of the mind. 

Under the definitions given it is evident 
that the first condition of intellectual efficiency 
is an adequate disposition for achievement 
which will here be designated by the term 
Spirit. 

The nature of Spirit as here understood 
may be developed from the following dialogue 



97 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

which appears in the First Alcibiades of Plato: 

Socrates. Now then, does not a man use 
his whole body? 

Alcibiades. Unquestionably. 

Socrates. But w^e are agreed that he who 
uses, and that w^hich is used, are different. 

Alcibiades. Yes. 

Socrates. A man is, therefore, different 
from his body? 

Alcibiades. So I think. 

Socrates. What then is a man? 

Alcibiades. I cannot say. 

Socrates. You can at least say that the 
man is that which uses the body? 

Alcibiades. True. 

Socrates. Now does anything use the 
body but the mind. 

Alcibiades. Nothing. 



98 



MIND AND BODY. 

Socrates. The mind is, therefore, the man, 

Alcibiades. The mind alone. 

The distinction here made between the 
mind and the body on the basis of use is recog- 
nized by Aristotle the foremost exponent of 
practical action as well as by Sir William 
Hamilton who seems to have given such action 
slight consideration. 

Now, wrhile the mind uses the body as a 
means for achievement it also employs certain 
qualifications of its ow^n. So that on a basis 
of use the mind may be regarded as that which 
uses all intellectual qualifications employed in 
the achievement of purposes. Or, to state it 
differently, the mind is that vvrhich w^ould re- 
main after all its useful capacities and faculties 
had been eliminated. This would leave what 
is generally known as Spirit which, in its most 



99 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

comprehensive sense has been defined by a 
leading authority as: 

*'The soul of man; the intelli- 
gent, immaterial and immortal part 
of human beings." 

The only way in which practical signif- 
icance can be given to this abstract conception 
is to consider spirit as the equivalent of a dis-- 
position for effort or action; for it is only 
through this disposition that spirit can mani- 
fest itself. And the only w^ay in vvrhich a 
disposition for effort or action can represent 
the intelligent part of man is by the systematic 
achievement of purposes. Thus, evidently, 
from these considerations, spirit is more con- 
cretely defined by the same authority as: 

'*Eager desire; disposition of 
mind excited and directed to a par- 
ticular object." 

100 



SPIRIT. 

Similarly, according to another recog- 
nized authority, spirit is: 

**That which pervades and 
tempers the conduct and thought of 
men.'* 

Thus it appears that spirit is to the mind 
what life is to the body and that as, to the 
extent that life is absent a body may not be 
recognized as an effective organism, so to the 
extent that a man is not endowed with spirit 
he may not be recognized as an intelligent 
agent. 

But although from what has been stated 
spirit when taken in the abstract represents 
the primordial substance of mind it may, when 
considered with respect to the practical affairs 
of life, be accepted as equivalent to a disposi- 
tion for the systematic achievement of pur- 
poses and, consequently, may be treated as an 
intellectual qualification. 

101 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Accordingly, spirit is here understood to 
be: 

That disposition for intelligent 
effort which prompts the mind to the 
systematic achievement of purposes. 

As so regarded, spirit first manifests it- 
self in the apparently aimless conduct of the 
infant, gradually develops under the influence 
of sensation, habit, thought and emotion and 
culminates in enterprise, industry and ambi- 
tion. 

Natural spirit is that aroused by the 
pleasure, pain, desire, fear or curiosity due to 
the influence of natural causes and to inherent 
propensities and corresponds to that which in- 
cites the lower animals to action. 

Acquired spirit is that vvrhich arises from 
habit, study, thought and the stimulation of 
mind induced by pride of actual achievement. 

102 



SPIRIT. 

In view of the evident high character and 
importance of a disposition for proper, intel- 
ligent and practical action the neglect w^ith 
which the spirit of practical achievement has 
been treated since the time of Aristotle stands 
forth as a remarkable feature of philosophy. 
This is because most philosophers are so ab- 
sorbed in the mere exercise of their mental fac- 
ulties that they do not realize the importance 
of practical effort. The great metaphysician 
Sir William Hamilton admits this, in effect, 

thus: 

*'But it is not knowledge, — it is 
not truth,— that he principally seeks; 
he seeks the exercise of his faculties 
and feelings; and, as in following 
after the one he exerts a greater a- 
mount of pleasurable energy than in 
taking formal possession of the 
thousand, he disdains the certainty 
of the many, and prefers the chances 
of the one." 

103 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The general result of this is indicated by 
the historian Buckle as follows: 

*'And whoever will take the 
pains fairly to estimate the present 
condition of mental philosophy, 
must admit that, notwithstanding 
the influence it has always exercised 
over some of the most powerful 
minds, and through them, over so- 
ciety at large, there is, nevertheless, 
no other study vvrhich has been so 
zealously prosecuted, so long con- 
tinued, and yet remains so barren of 
results." 

However great may be the spirit of a 
man it is certain he will be able to achieve no 
intelligent purpose without adequate know^l- 
edge. 

As an object of philosophical consider- 
ation knowledge admits of two distinct classi- 
fications: 

One of these is based upon the manner 
in which the knowledge has been acquired 
without regard to the use that may be made 

104 



KNOWLEDGE. 

of it and is that usually employed by metaphys- 
ical philosophers. The other classification 
has for its basis the immediate application of 
knowledge as a means for achievement of pur- 
poses and is generally used by practical phil- 
osophers and men of affairs. 

Considered with respect to the manner 
of its acquisition, knowledge was classed by 
the philosopher Locke in effect thus: 

Intuitive Knowledge: 

That which is acquired without 
apparent mental effort, such as 
knowledge of the axioms of mathe- 
matics and such as knowledge that 
a heavy body unsupported will fall 
tow^ards the earth. 

Demonstrative Knowledge: 

That which is gained by study 
and thought concerning the data of 
intuitive knowledge and concerning 
the facts and truths discovered 
through observation and experi- 
ment. 

105 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Knowledge considered with respect to 
its immediate application to achievement of 
practical purposes may be classified as follows : 

Theoretical Know^ledge: 

That w^hich is acquired in the 
prosecution and completion of theo- 
retical purposes and w^hich cannot 
be immediately applied by its pos- 
sessor to practical affairs. 

Practical Knowledge: 

That which by virtue of ex- 
perience gained through its previous 
use may readily be applied by its 
possessor to the prosecution and 
completion of practical purposes. 

According to this classification, items of 
practical knowledge may be likened unto serv- 
ants who are under immediate call, wrhile 
items of theoretical knowledge are like out- 
door servants w^ho must be sent for and even 
searched for and who may not be found until 
too late. 

106 



KNOWLEDGE. 

It is well known that certain knowledge 
w^hich is theoretical to one man may be prac- 
tical to another and that numerous important 
items of knowledge which at some time in the 
past were theoretical to all w^ho possessed them 
are now practical to many men. 

Therefore, the classification last given 
would seem to relate less to the know^ledge 
than to the general state of the mind that hap- 
pens to possess it and is, of course, the better; 
basis for a consideration of knowledge as an 
intellectual qualification necessary for the 
achievement of practical purposes. 

It must be admitted that the only con- 
clusive evidence of the ability of a man to apply 
an item of knowledge to achievement of a 
practical purpose is the fact of his actually 
having done so. 

107 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Therefore, all knowledge may be regard- 
ed as theoretical until made practical by the 
prosecution and completion of appropriate 
purposes. 

Now, any purpose with the knowledge 
acquired through its completion may after- 
wards be achieved in the same manner pro- 
vided, of course, that exactly the same con- 
ditions obtain and the same means are avail- 
able. In every such an ideal case spirit and 
knowledge are the only intellectual qualifica- 
tions necessary for the achievement of the pur- 
pose. 

But conditions as well as means are con- 
tinually undergoing change so that in strict- 
ness it seldom if ever happens that a purpose! 
can be achieved by spirit and knowledge alone. 
Thus it is that ability to achieve purposes must 
involve some additional qualification of mind. 

108 



DISCRETION. 

This additional qualification is that 
which enables the mind to modify means and 
methods according to the changing conditions 
of practice in order that an object which has 
been accomplished under certain conditions, 
with certain means and by certain methods, 
may also be readily accomplished under dif'- 
ferent conditions, with different means and by 
different methods. This quality is often re- 
fered to as sagacity; but sagacity is generally 
understood to be common to man and the 
lower animals and, consequently, does not 
appear to have sufficient breadth of meaning. 
The qualification here considered is more pro- 
perly sagacity improved and developed by 
thought concerning the data of knowledge. 
Accordingly, it w^ill be given the more compre- 
hensive title of Discretion taken in the sense 
indicated by the following description by the 

109 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

historian Hume in his ''Inquiry concerning the 

Principles of Morals." 

"The quality most necessary 
for the execution of any useful en- 
terprise is discretion: by which we 
carry on a safe intercourse with oth- 
ers, give due attention to our own 
and to their character, w^eigh each 
circumstance of the business we un- 
dertake, and employ the surest and 
safest means for the attainment of 
any end or purpose." 

As so understood Discretion may be de- 
fined as: 

That combination of proper- 
ties and faculties w^hich, w^hen unit- 
ed w^ith the proper spirit and ade- 
quate knowledge, qualifies the mind 
for the achievement of purposes re- 
lating to practical affairs. 

From this definition it follows that the in- 
tellectual qualifications that constitute intel- 
lectual efficiency are: spirit, practical knowl- 
edge and discretion. 

110 



SPIRIT, KNOWLEDGE AND 
DISCRETION. 

In order that a man may justify his in- 
tellectual efficiency, as here understood, he 
must not only possess spirit, knowledge and 
discretion but he must also manifest those 
qualifications with proper regard for the rela- 
tions which they naturally sustain to one an- 
other. 

Should the spirit of a man transcend his 
knowledge or his discretion his intellectual ef- 
ficiency might be diminished rather than in- 
creased because his excess of spirit -would be 
either without the direction of knowledge or 
the control of discretion and he would tend to 
overreach himself. This is the normal condi- 
tion of the youthful mind in which natural 
spirit predominates until knowledge and dis- 
cretion shall have been acquired. Also it is, 
of course, the condition of those mature minds 

in which natural and acquired spirit outrange 

111 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

knowledge and discretion and bring about dis- 
aster. 

Should a man acquire knowledge beyond 
the scope of his spirit or of his discretion, then, 
either his spirit w^ould not or his discretion 
could not make proper use of the surplus so 
that no increase in his intellectual efficiency 
could manifest itself except by accident. This 
is why the achievements of some men often do 
not measure up to their extensive learning. 

Should discretion be in excess of spirit or 
of knowledge intellectual efficiency would not 
be perceptibly increased because the surplus 
would either want the incentive of spirit or it 
would be without the data of knowledge. 
Thus it is that through absence of initiative or 
lack of education men do not or cannot take 
advantage of their opportunities. 



112 



INTELLECTUAL EFFICIENCY. 

In view of these considerations and of the 
definitions that have been given: 

Intellectual efficiency is here understood 

to be: 

A proportionate and efficient 
combination of spirit, practical 
knowledge and discretion. 



113 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER Vlli. 

FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL 
EFFICIENCY. 

The forms under which intellectual ef- 
ficiency manifests itself may be discussed un- 
der the two general heads of theoretical ability 
and practical ability. 

Theoretical ability is that state of mind 
w^hich manifests itself exclusively in achieve- 
ment of theoretical purposes. 

Accordingly, theoretical ability is limited 
to acquisition, conservation and inculcation of 
knowledge without regard to its definite or im- 
mediate application. 

Theoretical ability, considered w^ith re- 
spect to its purposes, may be classed into spec- 
ulative, mathematical and experimental abil- 
ity. 

114 



THEORETICAL ABILITY. 

Speculative ability is that condition 
which qualifies the mind for prosecution of 
speculative purposes. 

Mathematical ability is ability to dis- 
cover, develop and explain the relations of 
magnitude. 

Experimental ability is that which mani- 
fests itself in discovery by study, thought and 
experiment, of the relations of cause and ef- 
fect. 

Theoretical ability is naturally a great 
source of knowledge for use as a means fon 
achievement of practical purposes. To the 
extent knowledge from that source can be so 
used it is evident that theoretical ability itself 
may be treated as available means; and to the 
extent, if any, that such knowledge can not be 
so used theoretical ability may be regarded as 
a trancendental subject that needs not be con- 

115 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

sidered here further than especial occasion 
may require. 

Practical ability is that state or condition 
of mind which qualifies a man for achievement 
of practical purposes; or, when considered 
with respect to its practical relation to theoret- 
ical ability: 

Practical ability is that condition of the 
mind which manifests itself in the application 
of theoretical ability and other available 
means to the practical affairs of life. 

Practical ability manifests itself under 
different forms vvrhich are here distinguished 
as dexterity, skill and executive ability accord- 
ing to the character of the individual, the na- 
ture of the purpose and the means and meth-^ 
ods available for its achievement. 

The practical significance of each of these 



116 



DEXTERITY. 

forms of ability as developed from the data of 
observation, experience, history and science 
may be outlined as follows : 

Dexterity is ability to achieve a practical 
purpose solely by means of the mental and 
physical capacities and faculties of the individ- 
ual. Its feeble beginnings are observable in 
the infant and in maturity it is evidenced by 
such activities as talking, singing, vsralking, 
running, dancing, climbing, sw^imming, etc. 
In the earlier stages of human existence dexter- 
ity manifested itself by cunning, sw^iftness and 
agility in escaping danger and in procuring 
food and comfort. It grew with the knowl- 
edge gained through experience, with the dis- 
cretion developed by primitive processes and 
with the practice incited by fear and desire. 
Its gradual and natural development gave add- 



117 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ed activity and strength together with increas- 
ed ability and disposition to acquire greater 
dexterity still. By the laws of natural selec- 
tion it instinctively improved along lines best 
suited to the individual and his environment, 
thus forming the basis of the safety and com- 
fort w^ithout w^hich systematic progress along 
other lines would have been impracticable. 

But although dexterity is indispensable 
to progress it has serious limitations. For 
every feat must be within the feeble powers of 
the individual and thus w^hen taken by itself 
can not be of great importance. Moreover, 
he who relies entirely on his ow^n dexterity can 
prosecute but a single rational purpose at a 
time so that the achievements of such a man 
proceed in single file and thus present a w^eak 
formation. Furthermore, by dexterity alone 



118 



SKILL. 

the purposes of different men, even when there 
is no conflict, cannot be systematically subor- 
dinated to a single purpose of general signifi- 
cance. Owing to these limitations it could 
not have been until after man had advanced! 
beyond the stage of simple dexterity that his 
conquest of the lower animals began. 

Skill is here considered as ability to 
achieve a purpose by intelligent and immedi- 
ate use of powers of inert matter, properties of 
plants and faculties and propensities of ani- 
mals. As so understood, skill is manifested 
in the use of tools, in expert performance upon 
instruments, in horticulture, in agriculture, in 
successful medical practice and surgical opera- 
tions, in manufacture and use of machinery, in 
management and use of domestic animals and 
in numerous other vocations requiring the use 



119 
-9- 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

of similar means. It seems to have had its 
origin in the necessity for weapons of offense 
and defense against certain of the lower ani- 
mals. Beginning w^ith the club, ready and at 
hand, skill, by means of the knot and the prop- 
erties of w^ood and stone, achieved the axe, 
thence the javelin and thence the bow and ar- 
row. The making and use of these wreapons 
opened up a wide field for further development 
of dexterity and this in turn broadened the 
range of the skill that had made it possible. 

The development of skill facilitates and 
encourages its own growth and thus stimulates 
the spirit to make still further progress. For 
this reason, and from necessity, skill at an 
early stage discovered the properties of metals 
and made use of them, first in improvement of 
weapons and then in development of imple- 



120 



SKILL. 

ments of industry. This led to still more ef- 
fective weapons and implements and so on 
continually even to the present time. The 
crude v^eapons and implements originally de- 
veloped w^ere practically the first personal 
property possessed by man. 

Thus it appears that skill, by giving ex- 
istence and value to personal property not only 
gave incentive to further effort for improve- 
ment but made possible the progress of man 
far beyond the point to which dexterity alone 
could have taken him. 

But skill, though superior to dexterity as 
a means of progress, has similar limitations.) 
For every purpose possible to a man of skill 
must have his personal attention to the detail, 
and while he may use the powers of inert mat- 
ter, the properties of plants and the faculties 



121 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and propensities of animals he still must de- 
pend continually upon his own abilities and 
endurance. Again, he who relies entirely on 
his own skill can seldom prosecute more than 
a single purpose at a time and, therefore, can- 
not, as a rule, consolidate his efforts. More- 
over, since skill does not involve ability to 
manage men it can neither prevent the prose- 
cution of adverse purposes nor cause those 
which do not conflict to merge into a single 
purpose of magnified importance. Conse- 
quently, great purposes are generally beyond 
the range of skill. 

Executive ability is ability to achieve pur- 
poses by means of the qualifications of intelli- 
gent agents. Or, it may be more explicitly 
stated to be the ability to cause different men 
to subordinate their abilities and co-operate 



122 



EXECUTIVE ABILITY. 

in the achievement of a common purpose. 

Until man by his skill had acquired some 
personal property his executive ability, no 
doubt, vv^as limited to those slight traces showm 
by such of the low^er animals as habitually ex- 
ercise leadership for the sake of food and safe- 
ty. But w^hen men had realized the satisfac- 
tion to be derived from the products of skill 
and industry there naturally arose a desire for 
such things out of all proportion to ability or 
disposition to produce them. Thereupon, and 
in the absence of all direction and control, 
some men began to take by violence and 
stealth the property which had been acquired 
by others through their greater skill and indus- 
try. This naturally produced conflict and 
confusion among the purposes of different 
men, the only escape from which lay in caus- 



123 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ing men to subordinate their conflicting pur- 
poses to a general state of social order. For 
reasons given skill was not equal to this task.! 
So that, by bringing about a situation which 
required intelligent co-operation, skill had con- 
tributed to a condition with w^hich it could not 
cope and for w^hich the only remedy w^as to be 
found in the development of executive ability. 

Whence it appears that executive ability 
had its origin in the necessity of co-operation 
for mutual protection. 

Having thus been forced to establish a 
tolerable state of social order, men discovered 
the pow^er of systematic co-operation and 
thence found that thereby other desirable ob- 
jects entirely beyond the range of dexterity 
and skill could be readily accomplished. Ac- 
cordingly, executive ability began its course 



124 



EXECUTIVE ABILITY. 

and gradually became as it is today the genius 
of social and industrial progress. 

The man of executive ability, out of his 
own knowledge and discretion or from the 
know^ledge and discretion of other men deter- 
mines whether the objects he desires are prac- 
ticable and is able to select and govern those 
who can select and govern men who in turn are 
able to select and govern others and so on 
down to men of suitable dexterity and skill. 

Such a man, having determined upon a 
practical purpose, prepares the proper rules 
and regulations, selects the proper men and by 
appeal to their sensations, emotions and 
thoughts, enforces all his rules. These men, 
being qualified, select and apply all other 
means and the object is accomplished as a nat- 
ural consequence. Thus by prescription and 



125 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

enforcement of proper rules of order he uses 
the intellectual qualifications of other men and 
so conserves his time and energies. 

Should this man intrust the enforcement 
of his rules of order to a manager of suitable 
executive ability he would have a state of self- 
enforcing Lawr and Order -which he might 
leave entirely to itself and thus be free to turn 
his mind to something else. He might then 
repeat the process and by means of other man- 
agers carry forw^ard several important pur- 
poses at once and by such action show more 
practical ability than would be shown by the 
prosecution and completion of a single purpose 
at a time. 

Then, should this man correlate his pur- 
poses and under self-enforcing rules and regu- 
lations cause his managers to co-operate so as 



126 



EXECUTIVE ABILITY. 

to accomplish an object of magnified impor- 
tance he should show greater executive ability 
than any of his managers. And, similarly, 
each manager would show^ greater ability than 
w^ould be show^n by any man of dexterity or of 
skill who might be subject to his control. 
Whence, it appears that: 

The most efficient form of 
practical ability possible to any man 
must manifest itself in executive 
ability and is measured by the mag- 
nitude and scope of the correlated 
states of self-enforcing Law and Or- 
der he is able to establish and main- 
tain. 

Since executive ability must manifest it- 
self in the direction and control of men its ef- 
ficiency naturally depends upon the practical 
significance of what is known as Free Will. 



127 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER IX. 

FREE WILL 
AND EXECUTIVE ABILITY. 

Advocates of Free Will insist that every 
man is conscious of his ow^n Free agency; that 
this consciousness, being without exception 
cannot be denied and that, as a consequence, 
human action is independent of causes. 

Opponents of this doctrine contend that 
the mind after the determination of a purpose 
is different from what it was before; that this 
difference represents an effect; that this effect, 
by the Principle of Causation, must be due to 
the action of some cause and that this cause 
must act according to the Principle of Regu- 
lation. 

128 



FREE WILL. 

Others hold that action without cause is 
inconceivable; that cause is inconceivable ex- 
cept as the effect of preceding cause; that, con- 
sequently, Free Will is not a proper object of 
thought and that this being true, Free-agency 
can be neither proved nor disproved by reason- 
ing from abstract propositions. 

This purely metaphysical aspect of Free 
Will is clearly set forth by Sir William Hamil- 
ton thus: 

"It would, therefore have been 
better to show articulately that Lib- 
erty and Necessity are both incom- 
prehensible, as both beyond the lim- 
its of legitimate thought; but that 
though the Free-agency of Man 
cannot be speculatively proved, 
neither can it be speculatively dis- 
proved." 

Considering Free Will in the abstract this 

quotation seems unanswerable and, therefore, 

it will be accepted as true. 

129 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Whence, if the problem of Free Will is 
possible its solution must be reached through 
the known facts and conditions of human con- 
duct or action. 

Should the spirit of a man be entirely iso- 
lated from the influences of his sensations and 
emotions and should he then take action there 
would be conclusive evidence of Free Will. 
But the nearest approach to this condition is 
that of sleep in w^hich isolation from sensation 
and emotion is not know^n to be complete. 

In the event it could be proved that a man 
had been influenced equally in two different 
directions at the same time and that he had 
taken one course rather than the other then it 
might be conceded that he had exercised Free 
Will in -determining upon his action. While 
it is conceivable that such a condition might 

130 



FREEWILL. 

exist it would be impossible to prove it because 
the action of a man may be influenced by caus- 
es of which even he might not be conscious and 
of which an observer could have no knowl- 
edge. 

Were it possible to prove that the same 
man under the same conditions had acted dif- 
ferently at different times then the existence 
of Free Will w^ould have been demonstrated. 
But every man is continually undergoing men- 
tal and physical changes so that no man re- 
mains exactly the same from time to time. 
Also, the conditions by which the conduct or 
action of any and every man may be affected 
are likewise undergoing continual change. 
Consequently, in the nature of things, the 
same man cannot be placed under the same 
conditions at different times. 



131 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

From the considerations set forth it ap- 
pears that there is no particular fact of expe- 
rience available as conclusive evidence of Free 
Will 

This however, does not disprove the doc- 
trine of Free Will; it merely shows the inabil- 
ity of man to demonstrate the existence of 
Free-agency from any particular fact w^ithin 
the range of his possible experience. 

But although the existence of Free Will 
cannot be proved by particular fact, neither 
can it be so disproved. 

The truth of this is readily shown by the 
self-evident proposition that: 

An apparent absence of Free 
Will may be caused by an act of 
Free Will itself. 

Assuming the existence of Free Will the 
practical significance of this proposition may 
be illustrated by Executive Ability vvrhich has 

132 



FREE WILL AND EXECUTIVE ABILITY. 

been shown to be the most efficient form of 
practical ability. 

A man of Free Will and of pre-eminent 
executive ability might conceivably establish a 
perfect self-enforcing organization involving 
many employes. 

Now, the Free Will of every employe, 
wrhile at work, wrould have been subordinated 
to the general state of Law^ and Order estab- 
lished by the chief executive. 

In course of time the chief executive, in 
the exercise of his Free Will and with confi- 
dence in his self-enforcing rules and regula- 
tions, might leave the organization entirely to 
itself and devote his energies to other affairs. 

Under such conditions it is conceivable 
that the organization, in virtue of its practi- 
cally perfect state of Law and Order, might 
continue indefinitely its operations as before. 

133 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

And the situation would be the same even 
though the chief executive had been removed 
by death. 

In this illustration the only evidence of 
Free Will v^ould be that deduced from the 
state of Lavyr and Order in the organization 
taken as a v^hole. 

This means that: 

Free Will does not require its 
own direct or special manifestation. 

In addition to this it has been shown, in 

effect, that: 

Executive ability, the highest 
degree of practical ability, is meas- 
ured by the magnitude and scope of 
the correlated states of self-enforc- 
ing Law and Order it is able to estab- 
lish and maintain. 

Whence the proposition that: 

The greater the executive abil- 
ity, the less should be the special 
manifestations of Free Will. 

134 



FREE WILL AND EXECUTIVE ABILITY. 

This proposition is justified by experi- 
ence which shows that the man who believes 
he has Free Will and persists in its special man- 
ifestations is wanting in executive ability and 
not qualified for achievement of great pur- 
poses. 

But while the problem of Free Will can- 
not be solved from particular fact the general 
predominance of good purposes indicates, if it 
does not prove, that even though man may be 
by nature a free agent he is practically not so 
because of the influences to which he is con- 
tinually subjected and w^hich effectively con- 
trol his conduct as a whole. That is, man be- 
ing persistently driven to advance his ulti- 
mate welfare, his w^ill cannot, in practice, 
be recognized as absolutely free. 

Leaving out of consideration the contro- 
versial problem of Free Will it must be admit- 

135 

-10— 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

ted that executive ability is based upon the 

proposition that: 

In order to induce a man of ade- 
quate intellectual efficiency to 
achieve a given purpose it is only 
necessary to provide him v^ith suit- 
able means and subject his sensa- 
tions and thoughts to certain influ- 
ences. 

It must be conceded that there are innum- 
erable indications that this proposition is not 
true. None of these indications, hovsrever, is 
of any practical significance because, in the na- 
ture of things, there cannot be conclusive evi- 
dence that each did not arise either from men- 
tal inaptitude or from extraneous influences. 

Were the proposition not practical then 
it is certain that no man could be depended up- 
on to perform an allotted task; that men could 
not be subjected to discipline and that, conse- 
quently, the achievement of every purpose re- 

136 



FREE WILL AND EXECUTIVE ABILITY. 

quiring their systematic co-operation would be 
impracticable. 

That the proposition is practical is shown 
by the uniform and unquestioned efficiency of 
executive ability in the achievement of the 
numerous great and important purposes w^hich 
involve systematic co-operation of many men 
and w^hich mark the course of industrial, com- 
mercial and social progress. 

Whence, it must be admitted that there is 
not the slightest practical objection to the pro- 
position that: 

Any man unrestrained and of 
adequate ability, with suitable 
means and with his sensations and 
thoughts subjected to certain influ- 
ences may be intrusted w^ith the 
achievement of a certain purpose 
with the same confidence that fuel 
at a proper temperature in the open 
air may be depended upon to pro- 
duce combustion. 

137 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 

The application of this proposition to the 
practical affairs of life is attended with much 
difficulty; not because it is untrue but because, 
at the present stage of human progress, the 
abilities and aptitudes of diflFerent men and the 
influences to which they will respond are so 
largely matters of conjecture. 

This condition, however, naturally im- 
proves as men learn by experience that their 
individual interests are best subserved by co- 
operation for advancement of the common 
welfare. 



138 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER X. 

THE WISDOM OF MAN. 

The term Wisdom, or its equivalent in 
dead and living languages, taken in its greatest 
sense, has always been used to denote the high- 
est degree of intellectual excellence. 

But although authorities are generally 
agreed in regard to wisdom in the abstract 
there always have been wide differences of 
opinion concerning the nature and practical 
significance of that most excellent condition of 
the mind. 

Therefore, it behooves any one who may 
venture to form an adequate conception of wis- 
dom to consider and compare the conceptions 
of others; to reject those that are demonstrably 

139 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

deficient and then to establish his own concep- 
tion with proper regard to those which may re- 
main. 

It is written in the Book of Proverbs that: 

'*For wisdom is better than ru- 
bies; and all the things that may be 
desired are not to be compared to 
it. 

Thus did Solomon not only declare w^is- 
dom to be the highest degree of intellectual 
excellence but also gave to it pre-eminence 
above all other things. 

In the Book of Proverbs there is also writ- 

ten: 

**Go to the ant, thou sluggard; 
consider her w^ays and be wise." 

This shows that Solomon included in his 

conception of wrisdom a disposition to effort as 

manifested by certain of the lovvrer animals in 

procuring their safety, food and comfort. 

140 



SOLOMON AND SOCRATES. 

And Solomon himself had this disposi- 
tion to a high degree, because history shows 
that he valued wisdom, sought it and even 
prayed his God to give it to him in order that 
he might judge between good and bad and rule 
his people well. That is, he valued w^isdom 
and sought it as a means for the systematic ad- 
vancement of human welfare. 

But although the wise king fully recog- 
nized a disposition for effort or action as an 
element of wisdom he did not fail to realize the 
importance of keeping that disposition under 
proper direction and control, as is shown by 
the Proverb: 

'*Seest thou a man w^ise in his 
own conceit? there is more hope of a 
fool than of him." 

Socrates, often called the greatest of 

moral philosophers, believed wisdom to be so 

141 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

far beyond the intellectual excellence possible 
to man that: 

'*The wisest man is he who 
knows there is no wisdom in him." 

But during the trial at ^which he was con- 
demned to death for his doctrines he declared 
that he w^as guided by a Daemon or voice di- 
vine w^hich often forbade him to act but which 
never prompted him to any undertaking. 

Thus it appears that while Socrates rec- 
ognized the greatness and excellence of vsris- 
dom and realized the value of prudence as one 
of its elements he failed to inspire it with the 
disposition for practical effort or action upon 
which Solomon had laid such stress. 

Consequently, since a disposition to prac- 
tical action for the benefit of others is unques- 
tionably a part of intellectual excellence, the 



142 



PLATO. 

conception which Socrates had of wisdom was 
evidently inferior to that of the Jewish king. 

Plato, a disciple of Socrates and regarded 
as the greatest idealist of any age, held that 
such perfections as man may happen to possess 
are due to wisdom which he treated as the fruit 
of reason. Thus, by confining wisdom to the 
limits of reason he failed to give it a disposition 
for action w^hich has no definite relation to rea- 
son but is a distinct qualification of the mind. 
He also held that all knowledge which is based 
on the evidence of the senses is mere opinion 
wrhich in his own opinion may be true but 
might be false and that, therefore, all true wis- 
dom must be reasoned out from self evident 
propositions. Thus he deprived wisdom of 
the benefit of experience. Consequently, the 
great idealist, by limiting wisdom to reason 



143 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and denying the evidence of the senses depriv- 
ed it, in effect, of all practical significance. 

Therefore, it seems clear that the concep- 
tion of Solomon concerning w^isdom was much 
superior to that of Plato. 

Aristotle, a pupil of Plato and generally 
regarded as the greatest of ancient philos- 
ophers, held that all rational processes must be 
based on observation and experience and that 
the highest degree of intellectual excellence 
is founded upon virtue vs^hich must manifest it- 
self in prudent effort or action. He thus gave 
to wisdom the practical features wrhich had 
been withheld by the extreme prudence of 
Socrates and by the idealism of Plato. 

Thus it w^ould seem that the conception 
of wisdom reached by Aristotle was practical- 
ly the same as that of Solomon. 



144 



KANT. 

Immanuel Kant, probably the most pro- 
found metaphysical philosopher of modern 
times held that: 

**Perceptions without notions 
are blind and notions without per- 
ceptions are void." 

But, while he thus recognized the validity of 

experience he stated that: 

* 'Wisdom is the final purpose 
of human reason." 

He, therefore, made wisdom originate in 
reason, as Plato had done, and as a con- 
sequence, he did not recognize the prime sig- 
nificance of an adequate disposition for prac- 
tical effort or action. 

Accordingly, the conception which w^as 
held by Kant with respect to wisdom vvras evi- 
dently inferior to that of Solomon and even to 
that of Aristotle. 



145 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Within the last century Sir William Ham- 
ilton, the eminent Scottish metaphysician, 
stated his conception of intellectual excellence 
to be as follows: 

'*Thus, in the actualities of 
social life, each man, instead of be- 
ing solely an end to himself, — in- 
stead of being able to make every- 
thing subordinate to that full and 
harmonious development of his in- 
dividual faculties, in which his full 
perfection and his true happiness 
consist,— is, in general, compelled to 
degrade himself into the mean or in- 
strument towards the accomplish- 
ment of some end, external to him- 
self, and for the benefit of others." 

Thus it appears that in the estimation of 
a leading modern philosopher the systematic 
advancement of the general welfare of man- 
kind is so far from being an indication of in- 
tellectual excellence that it should be regarded 
as evidence of mental degradation. 

And within comparatively recent years 

146 



CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF WISDOM. 

this remarkable notion concerning intellectual 
excellence has been indorsed by a prominent 

educator with the statement that: 

"The man who pursues knowl- 
edge simply because it is useful is on 
the same low plane as the man w^ho 
follows honesty because it is the best 
policy." 

Such opinions of intellectual excellence 
can be justified by neither science, philosophy 
nor religion. They arise, no doubt, from the 
natural propensity of man to believe those 
things which he w^ishes to be true and from the 
tendency of every one to form his opinions of 
practical affairs from the standpoint of his own 
mental aptitude. However that may be it is 
certain that the conceptions of Solomon and 
Aristotle are superior to notions of wsdom 
based on the last two opinions. 

Coming down to the present time the 
leading definitions given in the standard dic- 

147 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tionaries may fairly be accepted as showing 
the different conceptions of wisdom now cur- 
rent. 

According to one of these authorities 

wisdom is: 

"Knowledge w^ith the capacity 
to make due use of it." 

Now, a mind limited to knowledge with 
a capacity to make due use of it is manifestly 
inferior to one with the same knowledge and 
capacity but w^ith a disposition to apply those 
qualities to the advancement of human wel- 
fare. 

Therefore, the definition does not repre- 
sent the highest degree of intellectual excel- 
lence. 

By another authority wisdom is defined: 

"The pow^er of discerning w^hat 
is true and right or w^hat is conduc- 
ive to the highest interests; discern- 
ment of the real characteristics and 
relations of conduct." 

148 



CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF WISDOM. 

Here, it will be observed, no considera- 
tion is given to a disposition for effort and, 
consequently, the definition is not complete. 
Another standard authority defines wis- 
dom as: 

**The power or faculty of form- 
ing the fittest and truest judgment 
of any matter presented for con- 
sideration ; a combination of discern- 
ment, discretion, and sagacity, or 
similar qualities and faculties, invol- 
ving also a certain amount of knowl- 
edge, especially the knowledge of 
men and things gained by experi- 
ence." 

Since this definition does not include a 
disposition for action it does not, for reasons 
already stated, express the highest degree of 
intellectual excellence. 

According to still another authority wis- 
dom is: 

**Know^ledge united w^ith a dis- 
position to use it for the best pur- 
poses." 

149 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

While this definition recognizes a disposi- 
tion for action as an element of wisdom it is 
deficient because knowledge does not always 
include the discretion necessary for the proper 
adaptation of effort or action to unexpected 
changes in practical conditions. 

Now^, rejecting all conceptions and def- 
initions that have been shown to be deficient 
there remain available for the establishment 
of an adequate definition of wisdom as the 
highest degree of intellectual excellence only 
the conceptions of Solomon and Aristotle. 

Accordingly, and with proper regard for 
those high conceptions human wisdom is here 
understood to be: 

That state or condition of mind 
which qualifies a man in disposition 
and ability for the systematic ad- 
vancement of human welfare. 



150 



IMPLICIT DEFINITION OF WISDOM. 

It has been shown that systematic ad- 
vancement of the welfare of man originates 
in and is determined by his own conduct; and 
it must be admitted that it is only through the 
intelligent achievement of good purposes that 
the systematic advancement of human welfare 
by the agency of man is practicable. 

Therefore, wisdom, in its relation to pur- 
pose may be implicitly defined as : 

That state or condition of mind 
w^hich qualifies a man in disposition 
and ability for the systematic 
achievement of good purposes. 

Since w^isdom involves both disposition 
and ability for achievement it must include in- 
tellectual efficiency w^hich has been showrn to 
be a proportionate and efficient combination 
of spirit, practical know^ledge and discretion 
regardless of any distinctions of good and evil. 



151 
n— 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 

Therefore, wisdom may be regarded as 
intellectual efficiency united with ability to 
distinguish good from evil purposes and a dis- 
position to avoid the evil and achieve the good. 

That qualification w^hich enables the 
mind to distinguish good from evil purposes is 
generally known as judgment. 

This, in view of the definition given of 

good and evil purposes, means that: 

Judgment is: 

Ability to determine whether 
the achievement of a purpose vsrill be 
sure in the end to advance the v/el- 
fare of mankind. 

But it is certain that even though a man 
may have intellectual efficiency and a fair 
degree of judgment he 'will often achieve pur- 
poses w^hich he must realize are inimical to 
the future welfare of himself and others. This 
is, of course, because the allurements of temp- 

152 



JUDGMENT. 

tation or other influences prevent their judg- 
ment from giving proper direction to the spirit 
of achievement vv^hich is an essential part of 
intellectual efficiency. 

Thus it appears that between judgment 
and spirit there is no definite affinity. 

Experience teaches that judgment can be 
acquired only by observation of the effect of 
completed purposes upon the w^elfare and 
progress of man. Consequently, it must be the 
result of study and thought concerning the data 
of knowledge and partake of the nature of dis- 
cretion. But, since men achieve evil purposes 
against what must be their better judgment 
it is clear that judgment has no practical re- 
lation to either knowledge or discretion. 

Therefore, judgment may be treated as 
a distinct intellectual qualification. 

153 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

While the spirit of a man may prompt 
him to achieve a purpose which he knows or 
has reason to beHeve is evil it is certain that he 
may be depended upon not to do so with an 
adequate degree of that excellent qualification 
of mind know^n as: 

Virtue, which is: 

A disposition to make the best 
use of available means for advance- 
ment of the welfare of mankind. 

According to this definition a man of ad- 
equate virtue not only wrill endeavor to avoid 
all evil but he will make every effort to achieve 
every good purpose within the range of his 
opportunities and abilities. 

This means that to the extent that natural 
or acquired spirit is subjected to the dictates 
of good judgment it becomes identical with 
virtue. 



154 



EXPLICIT DEFINITION OF WISDOM. 

In view of what has been stated, The 
Wisdom of Man may be explicitly defined as 
a combination of the following intellectual 
qualifications: 

Practical know^ledge: 

That which is immediately 
available for achievement of the pur- 
poses of man. 

Discretion : 

Ability to make efficient use 
of means under changing conditions 
of practice. 

Judgment: 

Ability to distinguish good 
from evil purposes. 

Virtue: 

Disposition to make the best 
and greatest use of all obtainable 
means for achievement of good pur- 
poses. 



155 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 
CHAPTER XL 

DEGREES OF HUMAN WISDOM. 

The satisfaction derived from intellectual 
exercise has led many great men to attach 
more importance to the mere pursuit of knowl- 
edge than to its possession or its use. 

Thus, Malebranche stated that: 

**If I held truth captive in my 
hand, I should open my hand and let 
it fly, in order that I might again pur- 
sue and capture it." 

This was emphasized by Lessing thus: 

"Did the Almighty, holding in 
his right hand Triitli and in his left 
Search after Truth, deign to tender 
me the one I might prefer, — in all 
humility, but without hesitation, I 
should request Search after Truth/' 

This sentiment seems to have culminated 

in the mind of Sir William Hamilton who ra- 
ise 



WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE. 

cognized it as follows: 

**Now the various opinions 
which prevail concerning the com- 
parative utility of human sciences 
and studies, have all arisen from two 
errors. 

**The first of these consists in 
viewing man, not as an end unto 
himself 9 but merely as a mean or- 
ganized for the sake of something 
out of himself; and under this partial 
view of human destination, those 
branches of know^ledge obtain ex- 
clusively the name of useful, which 
tend to qualify a human being to act 
the low^ly part of a dexterous in- 
strument. 

"The second and the more dan- 
gerous of these errors, consists in re- 
garding the cultivation of our fac- 
ulties as subordinate to the acquisi- 
tion of knowledge, instead of regard- 
ing the possession of knov^ledge as 
subordinate to the cultivation of our 
faculties." 

The context shows that he limits the 

cultivation of the mental faculties to the pur- 

157 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

suit of knowledge without regard to its practi- 
cal application and contains the following quo- 
tation from Aristotle: 

**The arts and sciences are powd- 
ers, but every pow^er exists only for 
the sake of action ; the end of philos- 
ophy, therefore, is not knowledge, 
but the energy conversant about 
knowledge." 

The meaning of Aristotle is here exactly 
the opposite of that attributed to him by the 
eminent Scottish philosopher. For, the arts 
and sciences are powers only as sources of 
knowledge so that the Grecian sage meant that 
knowledge exists only for the sake of action or 
application. Moreover, energy may be con- 
versant about knowledge not only in its ac- 
quisition but often to a greater extent in its 
use. Know^ing this, the foremost exponent of 
practical action, instead of limiting philosophy 
to the pursuit, naturally wrould have extended 

158 



WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE. 

it to the application of knowledge. And that 
this is what he intended is shown by the con- 
sideration that otherwise he could not consis- 
tently have maintained that the gods, who 
were supposed to possess all knowledge: 

"Are happy because they are 
active." 

Now, it is manifest that the quotation 
from Malebranche, in so far as it relates to 
wisdom as the highest degree of intellectual 
excellence, might be discredited by any true 
follovsrer of Solomon or Aristotle writh the 
statement that: 

Having captured truth I would 
not let it fly and w^aste my energies 
in taking it again ; but I would hold 
it, apply it to the achievement of 
good purposes and thus promote 
the wrelfare of myself and others. 

The pursuit of knowledge vsrithout any 
regard to its possession or its use is practically 

159 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

equivalent to the working out of an amusing 
puzzle. This being true, the man who con- 
fines himself to such pursuits follows knowl- 
edge only to the point of practical significance 
and then, by stopping short, places a limitation 
on his wisdom. Thus it is that many learned 
men through their dislike for practical effort 
are far from being w^ise. 

Fortunately, however, many brilliant 
men w^ith a disposition to pursue knovvrledge 
without regard to its practical application not 
only capture it but also imprison it carefully 
in their w^ritings. To this is due a great part 
of that immense fund of learning which, hav- 
ing been organized for convenient reference 
in the encyclopaedias and text books, is ac- 
cessible to all men as a most important means 
for the achievement of human purposes. 



160 



WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE. 

Thus it appears that while a disposition 
for mental exercise without a practical object 
limits the w^isdom of the individual it tends 
to increase the total wisdom possible to man. 

Again, know^ledge, in addition to its great 
potential value may upon occasion be made 
highly ornamental even though its possessor 
may have little or no ability for its practical 
application. 

Wherefore, many men wrho aspire to wis- 
dom confine their efforts to theoretical knowl- 
edge, believing that it alone will bring to them 
the highest degree of intellectual excellence. 
This is also true of those vainglorious men 
who would conceal from themselves and others 
their w^ant of disposition for practical effort. 
Thus, knowledge, being mistaken for wisdom, 
discretion and judgment are neglected and 



161 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

virtue is often excluded by a misguided am- 
bition. 

This pride of theoretical knowledge has 
always been widely prevalent and must be 
w^hat led Solomon to condemn conceit, gave 
excessive prudence to the Daemon of Socrates 
and caused that remarkable tendency of the 
philosophers of every enlightened age to neg- 
lect the vital element of spirit or disposition 
for practical action in forming their concep- 
tions of wisdom. 

Discretion, being native sagacity im- 
proved and developed by thought concerning 
the data of knowledge, is difficult to attain. 
This is chiefly because it involves ability to 
make ready adjustments of means and meth- 
ods to new and impending conditions. This 
ability, to any notable extent, can be acquired 
only by carefully preserved experience gained 

162 



WISDOM, DISCRETION, JUDGMENT. 

through persistent application of means and 
this requires labor, fortitude, self denial, prac- 
tical knowledge and fine discrimination of 
means as well as method. Since all these qual- 
ities are seldom found combined in a single 
person a man of large discretion is the excep- 
tion rather than the rule. Thus, the difficul- 
ties of discretion constitute a serious limita- 
tion to the w^isdom of every man. 

The judgment of any man with respect to 
a given purpose depends primarily upon his 
ability to predict: 

1 . The effect upon his own pres- 
ent w^elfare. 

2. The effect upon the present 
w^elfare of others. 

3. The ultimate effect upon his 
ow^n wrelfare. 

4. The ultimate effect upon the 
welfare of others. 

163 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Now, it is certain that beyond simple pur- 
poses comparable to those manifested by some 
of the lower animals no man can foretell with 
precision even the immediate effects of an 
achievement. In addition to this, even were a 
man able to predict each particular effect of 
the achievement of a purpose he must prede- 
termine the final general effect in order that 
his judgment might be complete and this is 
seldom possible except in the ordinary recur- 
rent purposes of life. 

These conditions place a serious limita- 
tion on the w^isdom of every man with the re- 
sult that the best he can do is to accept such 
rules of judgment as have been sanctioned by 
the experience of custom and by authority of 
Statute even though the propriety of many of 
these are regarded as problematical. 



164 



WISDOM AND VIRTUE. 

Virtue is the vital quality of human wis- 
dom. But it miust be possessed exactly to the 
right extent. For, if it is deficient intellectual 
efficiency lies dormant and judgment is futile; 
while if it transcends the limits of judgment it 
is apt to defeat its purposes and bring about 
confusion and disaster. This delicate adjust- 
ment requires not only suitable know^ledge, 
large discretion and good judgment but also 
the control of all those passions and propensi- 
ties of man in which are to be found much of 
his weakness as well as much of his strength. 
Thus it seems that there is no capacity, faculty 
or propensity of mind that is not directly or 
indirectly related to the qualification of virtue. 

In view^ of w^hat has been stated there ap- 
pears a truth which although generally well 
know^n seems to be too unwelcome to be ap- 



165 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

preciated and which may be stated in general 
terms thus: 

No man contains within him- 
self to any notable extent that just 
and proportionate combination of 
practical knowledge, discretion, 
judgment and virtue w^hich consti- 
tutes true wisdom. 

But while this is true of the human indi- 
vidual it is not necessarily true of a number of 
men taken as a w^hole. For, there are men of 
ample know^ledge, others of fair discretion, 
some of tolerable judgment, as human judg- 
ment goes, and all of these may have some 
virtue. And there are certain other men of suf- 
ficient executive ability to select, classify and 
organize those men and cause them to co-ope- 
rate in the prosecution and completion of some 
good and important purpose and thus display, 
as a whole, a notable degree of wisdom. 

166 



SIMPLE AND COMPOUND WISDOM. 

Were this not true then human progress 
would be as insignificant as the wisdom of the 
individual, but that it is true is show^n by num- 
erous great and good achievements which 
otherwise would not have been possible. 

Whence two propositions must be true: 

1 . The wisdom of the human indi- 
vidual cannot be great and at its 
highest limit consists of executive 
ability and virtue combined with a 
judgment that recognizes its own 
deficiencies and defers to the best 
available judgments of other men. 

2. The wisdom of man in general 
vv^ith its qualities existing in differ- 
ent men but properly combined by 
executive ability is great in propor- 
tion to the knowledge and discretion 
of the individuals and to the judg- 
ment and virtue of the whole. 

From the explicit definition given it is evi- 
dent that the wisdom of every man, by reason 
of its virtue, naturally prompts him to the 

167 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

achievement of every good purpose writhin the 
scope of his abilities and opportunities. 

Therefore, the w^isdom of any man must 
be estimated from the nature and practical sig- 
nificance of the purposes w^hich he may actual- 
ly have achieved. 

Accordingly, it will be assumed, as was 
done in treating of intellectual efficiency, that 
every man is free and able to obtain sufficient 
means for the achievement of his practicable 
purposes. 

Under that assumption the different de- 
grees of wisdom possessed by the human in- 
dividual may be exemplified thus: 

The common laborer who earns an hon- 
est living shows knowledge of his implements 
and of the materials upon v/hich he uses them, 
discretion in their use, judgment in his honesty 
of purpose and virtue by his industry and per- 

168 



MANIFESTATIONS OF WISDOM. 

sistence. He, therefore, shows some wisdom 
which, though of small degree, is greater than 
is shown by him who labors not at all. 

The artisan w^ho makes a useful piece of 
mechanism shows knowledge of the properties 
of matter, discretion in their use and in the 
states of law^ and order show^n in the machine, 
judgment in its value and utility and virtue by 
the conduct and completion of his purpose. 
This artisan displays more knowrledge and dis- 
cretion, better judgment, greater virtue and, 
therefore, a higher degree of w^isdom than the 
common laborer. 

The man of affairs w^ho organizes artisans 
and laborers under rules and regulations so 
that all shall work together and by proper 
measures surely bring about an excellent re- 
sult shows knowledge of men and means, dis- 
cretion by the prescription and enforcement of 

169 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

his rules, judgment in the nature of his pur- 
pose and virtue by its laudable achievement. 
Manifestly such a man displays more wisdom 
than is show^n by any artisan or laborer work- 
ing under him. 

Should this man of affairs select a mana- 
ger of sufficient executive ability to enforce his 
rules and regulations he then, in so far as he 
himself might be concerned, vs^ould have es- 
tablished a state of self-enforcing law and or- 
der to which he might entrust the ultimate ac- 
complishment of his good and useful object. 
Then, should he by rep'^ti tion of this process 
carry forward simultaneously several useful 
purposes he would display more wisdom than 
would be shown by any manager whom he 
might employ. 

Should he select his purposes with due 



170 



WISDOM OF THE STATESMAN. 

regard for their relations to each other and or- 
ganize them under proper regulations so that 
all would be carried forward and abreast and 
finally be merged into a single and proportion- 
ately great and good result he would show 
more wisdom than the man who might achieve 
but not consolidate those purposes. 

The statesman who serves his country- 
men and by precept and example increases the 
knowledge, enhances the discretion, improves 
the judgment and stimulates the virtue of the 
citizen in conservation of the present state, 
shows knowledge by his precepts, discretion 
by his influence, judgment by the nature of his 
purpose and virtue by his conduct and exam- 
ple. He thus prevents confusion among the 
purposes of many different men and makes 
possible a state of social law and order. 



171 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

But the statesman who prevents confu- 
sion is manifestly not so wise as he w^ho by 
prescription and enforcement of proper rules 
of order causes his countrymen to correlate all 
their purposes and work together for the wel- 
fare and progress of the w^hole. 

And w^iser than any other is the statesman 
who by appealing to experience, to sensation 
and to thought causes salutary rules of order 
to carry their own enforcement wth them and 
thus builds up a comprehensive state of self- 
enforcing law and order which consolidates 
the wisdom of many men in the achievement 
of a single practical purpose of great and in- 
creasing common good. 

The achievement of such a purpose is the 
end and aim of civilization and the perfection 
of civilization is recognized as the highest ideal 
of human wisdom. 

172 



HIGHEST DEGREE OF HUMAN 
WISDOM. 

But perfect civilization requires a com- 
prehensive code of salutary rules of order to 
each and every one of w^hich every man must 
give spontaneous obedience. 

From the considerations set forth, all of 
which are confirmed by the facts of history 
and by the convictions of every man of com- 
mon sense, it must be true that: 

The highest possible degree of 
human w^isdom is that wrhich must 
manifest itself in the best and great- 
est use, through self-enforcing law^s 
and rules of order, of all obtainable 
means for the achievement of a sin- 
gle good, great and practical pur- 
pose. 



173 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

CHAPTER XII. 

UNLIMITED WISDOM. 

The notion that the universe was created 
and is governed by a single supernatural Cause 
of absolute liberty, infinite power and unlim- 
ited wrisdom is understood to be one of the 
greatest of human conceptions. 

This conception is sublimely expressed 
by the Scriptural passages: 

''In the beginning God created 
the heaven and the earth." 

*'The Lord by wisdom hath 
founded the earth; by understand- 
ing hath he established the heav- 
ens. 

To discover the practical significance of 

the unlimited wisdom of the Creator is a prob- 

174 



UNLIMITED WISDOM. 

lem that has enlisted the energies of the theo- 
logians and philosophers of every enlightened 
age. 

It seems to have been generally under- 
stood that two kinds of w^isdom are no more 
possible than tvsro kinds of truth and that, con- 
sequently, the unlimited wisdom of the Deity 
differs from the finite w^isdom of man, not in 
kind but only in degree. 

This is recognized and expressed in the 

Scriptures by the passage: 

**So God created man in his 
own image; In the image of God 
created he him; male and female 
created he them." 

Therefore, the best that any man can do 

is to assume that the creative and governing 

Cause with absolute liberty and infinite power 

is possessed, to the highest possible degree, of 

all the intellectual qualifications which consti- 

175 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

tute the wisdom of man and then to accept the 
philosophical consequences which may be de- 
veloped from that basis. 

Now, it has been shown that human wis- 
dom is a combination of knowledge, discretion, 

judgment and virtue and that: 

The highest possible degree of 
human vsrisdom is that which must 
manifest itself in the best and great- 
est use, through self-enforcing law^s 
and rules of order, of all obtainable 
means for the achievement of a sin- 
gle good, great and practical pur- 
pose. 

Whence for reasons stated, and in so far as 
man is able to determine: 

The unlimited wisdom of a 
creative and governing Cause of ab- 
solute liberty and infinite power will 
manifest itself by the prosecution of 
a single definite purpose illimitably 
good and great, in the achievement 
of which all causes will have the 
greatest possible scope under a per- 
fect state of self-enforcing Law and 
Order. 

176 



PRIMORDIAL PROPOSITIONS. 

This being understood, there may be es- 
tablished by means of the explicit definition 
given of the Wisdom of Man the following 
primordial propositions: 

1 . Before the beginning of organ- 
ized existence there must have been 
formed a single definite purpose il- 
limitably good and great. 

For, otherwise the virtue of the creative 
Cause would have been deficient and unlim- 
ited wisdom would not have been possible. 

2. Causes necessary for the great 
purpose must either have existed in 
the beginning or must have been 
created. 

For, were this not true then the virtue of 

the creative Cause of infinite pow^er wrould 

have been limited. 

3. The greatest possible scope 
must have been given to all avail- 
able causes under perfect self-en- 
forcing principles, laws and rules of 
order. 

177 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

For otherwise, certain causes would not 
be subject to systematic control and an illimit- 
able definite purpose might be impracticable. 

4. In the beginning every corpo- 
real, vital and intellectual entity 
must have been in the crudest possi- 
ble state consistent with mere exist- 
ence. 

For, were this not true then all available 

causes would not have been given the greatest 

possible scope. 

5. All events necessary for the il- 
limitable definite purpose must duly 
and surely come to pass and no oth- 
ers must be possible. 

For, any event less would make the total 
insufficient, any additional w^ould transcend 
the illimitable purpose and any arbitrary act 
or relation vvrould mean a defect in some prin- 
ciple, law or rule of order w^hich might destroy 
all definite relation and bring about confusion. 



178 



PHENOMENA OF EXISTENCE. 

Those five propositions, taken altogether, 
mean that in order that any hypothesis of a 
creative and governing Cause of absolute lib- 
erty, infinite power and unlimited wisdom 
may be sustained it must be true that: 

The dominion of self-enforc- 
ing Law and Order is absolute and 
unconditional. 

The extent to w^hich the hypothesis of a 
single Cause of unlimited wisdom accords with 
the observed phenomena of existence may be 
indicated generally thus: 

The orderly progress of events and the 
apparent states of Law and Order that prevail 
among them all suggest intelligent purpose 
and control; the general w^elfare and progress 
of mankind indicate the purpose to be good 
and the tremendous and incessant action of ex- 
istence denotes that it is great. 

179 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

That existence contains adequate means 
for achievement of a definite purpose illimit- 
ably good and great is indicated by the abund- 
ance and diversity of existing causes, by their 
actual and potential energies and by the mani- 
fold and marvelous, beneficial and efficient re- 
lations that are knov^rn to prevail among them 
all. 

That every entity was, at the beginning, 
in the crudest possible state and that, conse- 
quently, all causes then had the greatest con- 
ceivable scope is show^n in all departments of 
existence: 

In Corporeal Existence: 

By vv^hat is known to have been the orig- 
inal state of matter in v/hich apparent confu- 
sion was flagrant and extreme. This naturally 
gave to mechanical and to chemical energies 
the greatest possible range of operation. 

180 



ORIGINAL CRUDITY, 

In Vital Existence: 

By the low forms of vitality under which 
plants and animals made their first appearance 
on the earth and by which, at the beginning, 
vital energies were given the widest imagin- 
able range. 

In Intellectual Existence: 

By the ignorance, superstition, immor- 
ality, cruelty, injustice and general depravity 
w^hich characterized the conduct of man dur- 
ing the early stages of his career and of which 
there are innumerable conspicuous instances 
at the present time. It is manifest that this 
state of mind, so productive of evil, cannot be 
justified except by the predominance of good 
purposes and by the consideration that other- 
wise the intellectual energies of man could not 
have been given their greatest and most effi- 
cient scope. 

181 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, 

That all existing causes and their ener- 
gies are subject entirely to perfect self -enforc- 
ing Law and Order is indicated everywhere 
wthout exception: 

In Corporeal Existence: 

By the systematic processes through 
which it has been brought from chaos to its 
present magnificent state of progressive devel- 
opment by corporeal energies acting according 
to self-enforcing mechanical and chemical 
laws. 

In Vital Existence: 

By the gradual and orderly progress of 
vegetable and animal life from the lowest to 
the highest forms by vital energies acting un- 
der the self-enforcing law^s of Natural Selec- 
tion and by the marvelous relations among 
such forms as well as between the phenomena 
of organic and inorganic existence. 

182 



UNIVERSAL LAW AND ORDER. 

In Intellectual Existence: 

By the gradual advancement of knowl- 
edge from the lowest possible condition by in- 
tellectual energies impelled by natural causes 
and directed by self-enforcing law^s of sensa- 
tion, thought and emotion. Also, by the sys- 
tematic elevation of moral and religious ideals 
from abject depravity through the wonderful 
self-enforcing, natural and ultimate predomi- 
nance of the good over the evil. 
In Existence Generally: 

By the manifold relations among phe- 
nomena widely different in kind, which rela- 
tions might not exist and apparently need not 
prevail did they not contribute to a perfect 
state of self-enforcing universal Law^ and Or- 
der subject to no arbitrary change and admit- 
ting of no interference. Also, by the condi- 
tion that among all the countless observations 

183 

-13 - 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

and discoveries of Philosophy and Science 
there is not the slightest conclusive evidence 
that any event has ever happened which did 
not come to pass in strict accordance v^ith self- 
enforcing Law and Order. 

Whence, it may be affirmed that: 

All phenomena of existence are in full 
accord with the hypothesis of a single Cause 
of unlimited wisdom. 

Therefore, Wisdom, in whatsoever sub- 
stance it may inhere and to wrhatsoever extent 
it may exist, must sustain to purpose and to 
self-enforcing Law and Order the following 
general relations: 

1 . The greater the w^isdom the 
greater must be the best and great- 
est possible purpose. 

For, w^isdom writhout a corresponding pos- 
sible purpose w^ould be unable to express its 
full practical significance. 

184 



RELATIONS OF WISDOM. 

2. The greater the wisdom the 
more abundant and diverse must be 
the means available for systematic 
achievement. 

For, the degree of wrisdom depends upon 
the extent and diversity of the means it actual- 
ly and successfully applies. 

3. The greater the wrisdom the 
greater must be the state of self-en- 
forcing Law and Order w^hich can 
be established and maintained. 

For otherw^ise, the systematic achieve- 
ment of the best and greatest purpose might 
fail from want of proper method. 

4. The greater the w^isdom the 
greater is the state of self-enforcing 
Law and Order which it must estab- 
lish and maintain. 

For vvrisdom, by reason of its virtue, re- 
quires the best and greatest use of all available 
means and this is practicable only through self- 
enforcing laws and rules of order. 

185 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

If the All-powerful, All-wise Cause has 
no being then, in view of what has been stated 
concerning the phenomena of existence, hu- 
man wisdom itself must be the effect of natural 
causes and it must be conceded that: 

All events must come to pass 
according to self-enforcing law^ and 
order. 

This means that for all the causes, effects 

and events endurable by man as the possessor 

of finite wisdom and dependent entirely upon 

his own achievements for advancement of his 

welfare, tw^o conditions must prevail: 

1 . That wrhich can happen in the 
course of self-enforcing law and or- 
der will not come to pass in any 
other w^ay. 

2. That which can not hap- 
pen in the course of self-enforcing 
law and order will not come to pass 
at all. 

For, did not these conditions prevail there 
would be no adequate basis for the system- 

186 



PHILOSOPHICAL CONSEQUENCES. 

atic achievement of any purpose and human 

wisdom would be impossible. 

Again, it has been shown that under any 

hypothesis of a single AU-pow^erful, All-w^ise 

creative and governing Cause: 

The dominion of self-enforcing 
law^ and order must be absolute and 
unconditional. 

This means that for all possible causes, 
conditions, effects and events three proposi- 
tions must be true: 

1 . That which can happen in 
the course of self -enforcing law^ and 
order w^ill not come to pass in any 
other way. 

2. That w^hich cannot hap- 
pen in the course of self-enforcing 
law and order cannot come to pass 
at all. 

3. Everything that can hap- 
pen in the course of self-enforcing 
law and order will surely come to 
pass. 

For, were these propositions not true then 

187 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

there would be no adequate bcisis for the sys- 
tematic achievement of a single definite pur- 
pose inimitably good and great and the exer- 
cise of unlimited wisdom would be impossible. 
And that they are true is indicated without 
exception by all the phenomena of existence 
known and understood by man. 

The magnificent state of self-enforcing 
Law^ and Order w^hich prevails throughout the 
phenomena of corporeal, vital and intellectual 
existence not only makes human w^isdom pos- 
sible but gives to man the means and opportu- 
nity for continual addition to the wisdom that 
is in him. It thus enables man not only to sus- 
tain but also to accelerate the systematic ad- 
vancement of his welfare. 

In addition to this it must be admitted 
that it was through the contemplation and 



188 



BENEFICIAL CONSEQUENCES. 

progressive appreciation of this great state of 
universal law and order that man was gradu- 
ally brought to the conception of a single crea- 
tive and governing Cause with liberty, power 
and wisdom transcending all conceivable lim- 
itations ; w^hich conception in its higher practi- 
cal applications under the doctrines of Chris- 
tian Religion has done so much to promote the 
co-operation of men for general advancement 
of human welfare. And history indicates that 
without that great conception man could never 
have advanced through certain stages of intel- 
lectual, moral and spiritual development and 
that even though it does involve inconceivable 
causes and conditions and even though it may 
not be true it has contributed as much to hu- 
man welfare and progress as established fact 
and demonstrated truth. 



189 



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY. 

GENERAL CONCLUSION. 

In view of all that has been set forth con- 
cerning Purpose, Law and Order, Means and 
Method, Intellectual Efficiency and Wisdom it 
seems clear that: 

Under an adequate conception of Wis- 
dom the findings of Practical Philosophy are 
in substantial accord with the hypothesis of a 
single supernatural Cause of absolute liberty, 
infinite power and unlimited w^isdom until that 
transcendental doctrine reaches the confines 
of conceivable existence and passes out into 
the Great Unknown. 



190 



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